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William of Ockham,  
From His Summa of Logic, Part I: 
ADAM (OF WODEHAM’S) 
PROLOGUE, OCKHAM’S PREFATORY 
LETTER AND CHS. 1–6, 8–13, 26–5 
28, 30–31, 33, 63–66, 70, 72, WITH 
SUMMARIES OF CHS. 7, 29, 32. 
[The Prologue of Friar and Master Adam of England1] 
(1) The authority of many experts teaches what great fruits the science 
of language that we call “logic” brings forth for the followers of truth, while 10 
reason and experience clearly confirm and prove [it].2 Hence Aristotle, the 
main originator of this science, calls [it] now an introductory method, now a 
way of knowing, now a science common to all [things] and the way to truth. 
By these [phrases] he indicates that the entryway to wisdom is accessible to 
no one not educated in logic. Averroes too, the interpreter of Aristotle, says in 15 
his [Commentary on the] Physics3 that dialectic is “the tool for distinguishing 
between the true and the false”. For it settles all doubts, [and] dissolves and 
1That is, Adam Wodeham, a contemporary of Ockham and possibly for a while his 
personal secretary.  
2Adam is paraphrasing the opening lines of Boethius’ De divisione, which say the 
same thing about the “science of dividing.” See Jacques-Paul Migne, ed. Patrologiae cursus 
completus ... series latina, 221 vols., Paris: J.P. Migne, 18441864, vol. 74, col. 875D. 
(This series is conventionally referred to as the Patrologia latina, and cited simply as the 
“PL.” I will follow this convention below.) 
3Averroes, In Arist. Physicam I, textus 35, ed. Juntina, IV, fol. 11vb.  Note: I am here 
and throughout following the references given in the critical edition of the Summa logicae, 
Gedeon Gál and Stephen F. Brown, eds., (“Opera philosophica,” vol. 1; St. Bonaventure, NY: 
The Franciscan Institute, 1974). The editors used the “earlier” Latin “Juntina” edition of 
Averroes. There was also a “later” edition published a few years afterwards, which is much 
more readily available nowadays, manly because it has been photoreprinted. The folio refer-
ences are not at all the same. So those who want to look up these references will have to do 
some homework. 
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penetrates [to the bottom of] all the difficulties of Scripture, as the distin-
guished teacher Augustine bears witness.4 
(2) For since the actions of a wise [man] toward another [person] are 
two, “not to lie about what he knows, and to be able to show up a liar”, as is 
written in the Sophistic Refutations,5 but this cannot come about without dis-5 
tinguishing the true from the false, which only this [logical] method does, 
[therefore] it is quite apparent that it is a most useful [method] for one who 
speculates. 
(3) This alone provides the ability to argue about every problem and 
teaches how to resolve every kind of sophism and to find the middle [term] of 10 
a demonstration. It frees the mind too from the chains by which (alas) it was 
constrained, and restores it to liberty. For just as chains bind the limbs of the 
body and prevent [them from performing] the tasks for which they were de-
signed, so false and sophistical arguments tie up the mind, as Aristotle teach-
es.6 15 
(4) Likewise, this art uncovers the darkness of errors and directs the 
acts of human reason like a kind of light. In fact, when compared to light, it is 
found to be prior. For just as, if physical light were blocked out, human ac-
tions would be either halted [altogether] or else random and often to the det-
riment of the doer, so [are] acts of human reason without skill in this faculty. 20 
(5) For we see many [people] who, neglecting this science [and never-
theless] wishing to devote themselves to learning, wander about all over the 
place scattering various errors around in [their] teaching, making up opinions 
full of absurdity with no restraint or order, weaving and putting together 
scarcely intelligible statements, suffering from something like the dreams of 25 
sluggards and the fictions of poets, ignorant of the meaning of their own 
speech.7 They are all the more dangerously in error the more they regard 
themselves as wise in comparison with others, recklessly hurling falsehoods 
indiscriminately in place of truths at the ears of their listeners. 
(6) And so, moved by a consideration of the abovementioned use-30 
fulness that logic serves, the distinguished Peripatetic philosopher Aristotle 
ingeniously put it together.8 [But] because of the obscurity of the Greek lan-
guage [when] translated into Latin, one could scarcely follow [the text] with-
out spending a great deal of time. For this reason, later [people] who were 
well enough educated in these matters showed those who were preoccupied 35 
[with other concerns] the easy way to [logic] by writing various works. 
Among these [people], I regard the preeminent one, certainly, [to be] the ven-
                                                 
4Augustine, De doctrina christiana II, 31 n. 48, PL 34, col. 58.  
5Aristotle, Sophistic Refutations 1, 165a24–27.  
6Ibid., 165a13–17.  
7‘ignorant  speech’ = vim propriae vocis ignorantes. This could also mean “igno-
rant of the strength of their own voice,” but that seems less likely here.  
8At Sophistic Refutations 34, 183b34–36, Aristotle in effect claims to have invented 
logic. Before his work, he says, nothing had been written on the topic.  
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erable Doctor Friar William, an Englishman by nationality, a “Minor” by or-
ders,9 but exalted in the keenness of his ability and the truth of his teaching.10 
(7) Indeed, this exceptional Doctor, often assailed by many [people’s] 
requests, put together an investigation of the whole of this [logical] method, 
clearly and transparently and earnestly, starting from terms (as from what is 5 
prior), and then proceeding to the rest until he arrived at the end. And so, di-
recting his pen to the students who were repeating their requests for this 
splendid but succinct volume, and yet wishing to benefit all, he began by say-
ing: 
10 
                                                 
9That is, he belonged to the “Order of Friars Minor,” the Franciscans.  
10There is a little word-play here. The point is that, although Ockham is a “Minor” in 
religious orders, he is by no means “minor” in these latter respects.  
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[William of Ockham’s Prefatory Letter] 
(1) In your recent letter, brother11 and dearest friend,12 you were anx-
ious to persuade me to gather together certain rules of the art of logic into one 
treatise, and to send them to Your Honor.13 Since, therefore, moved by a love 
for your progress and for the truth, I cannot go against your requests, I shall 5 
try [to do] what you ask, and shall undertake a matter that is difficult for me 
but fruitful, I think, both for you and for me. 
(2) For logic is the most useful tool of all the arts. Without it no sci-
ence can be fully known. It is not worn out by repeated use, after the manner 
of material tools, but rather admits of continual growth through the diligent 10 
exercise of any other science. For just as a mechanic who lacks a complete 
knowledge of his tool gains a fuller [knowledge] by using it, so one who is 
educated in the firm principles of logic, while he painstakingly devotes his 
labor to the other sciences, acquires at the same time a greater skill at this art. 
Thus, I regard the common [saying], “The art of logic is a slippery art”,14 as 15 
appropriate only for those pay no heed to the study of wisdom. 
(3) Therefore, proceeding with the content of the investigation of log-
ic, one must take one’s beginning with terms, as from what is prior. Then 
there will follow the investigation of propositions, and finally of syllogisms 
and the other species of argumentation. 20 
[Chapter 1] 
(1) All those who treat logic try to show that arguments are put to-
gether out of propositions and propositions out of terms. Thus a term is noth-
ing else but a proximate part of a proposition. For Aristotle, when defining a 
term in Prior Analytics I,15 says “I call a term [that] into which a proposition16 25 
                                                 
11‘brother’ = frater = Friar. Ockham is writing to a fellow Franciscan. (The Do-
minicans were also called “friars,” but it is unlikely Ockham is referring to a Dominican 
here.) 
12One manuscript of the Summa logicae describes Ockham’s Preface as directed to 
“his student mentioned above” — that is, to Adam Wodeham, who wrote the preceding Pro-
logue. But another manuscript says that it was written to a certain “Friar William of 
Ambersbergh [Ambusbergh?] of the Order of [Friars] Minor from the English province.” I 
know nothing about that “Friar William.” 
13‘Your Honor’ = tuae dilectioni, a polite form of address. As far as I know, it is not 
an indication of any official rank or status. 
14I have never encountered this “common saying.” Ockham’s editors (p. 6 n. 1) cite 
Raymond Lull, De venatione substantiae accidentis et compositi: “Because logic is a difficult 
science, slippery and extensive ”  I doubt that that is what Ockham was thinking of, but I 
can suggest nothing better. The exact sense of the saying is not clear. 
15Aristotle, Prior Analytics I, 1, 24b16–18. 
16Aristotle has ‘premise’ (= protasis) here. The Latin is ‘propositio’, which some-
times means “premise” but came also  as here  to mean “proposition” more generally. 
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is resolved, such as a predicate and that of which it is predicated,17 whether 
being or non-being is added or taken away.”18 
(2) But although every term is part of a proposition, or can be, never-
theless not all terms are of the same kind. So in order to have a complete 
knowledge of terms, we must first get familiar with certain divisions among 5 
terms. 
(3) Now you have to know that just as, according to Boethius on De 
interpretatione I,19 there are three kinds of language, namely written, spoken 
and conceived, [the last] having being only in the intellect, so [too] there are 
three kinds of term, namely written, spoken and conceived. 10 
(4) A written term is a part of a proposition written down on some 
physical object, which [proposition] is seen by the bodily eye, or can be [so] 
seen. 
(5) A spoken term is a part of a proposition spoken by the mouth and 
apt to be heard by the bodily ear. 15 
(6) A conceived term is an intention or passion of the soul naturally 
signifying or consignifying something [and] apt to be a part of a mental prop-
osition and to supposit for the same thing [that it signifies]. Thus, these con-
ceived terms and the propositions put together out of them are the “mental 
words” that Blessed Augustine, in De trinitate XV,20 says belong to no lan-20 
guage because they abide only in the mind and cannot be uttered outwardly, 
although utterances are pronounced outwardly as signs subordinated to them. 
(7) Now I say that utterances are signs subordinated to concepts or in-
tentions of the soul, not because, taking the word ‘signs’ in a proper sense, 
these utterances always signify those concepts of the soul primarily 25 
                                                 
17That is, the subject. 
18The last clause is simply a long-winded way of saying “whether it is affirmative or 
negative.” 
19Boethius, In librum De interpretatione, ed. 2a, I, PL 54, col. 407B. In the Middle 
Ages, the De interpretatione was divided into two books. Boethius wrote two commentaries 
on the De interpretatione. It is the second one that Ockham is citing here. 
20Augustine, De trinitate XV, 10, 19; 12, 22; 27, 50 (PL 42, cols. 1071, 1075, 1097). 
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and properly, but rather because utterances are imposed21 to signify the same 
things that are signified by the concepts of the mind, so that the concept pri-
marily signifies something naturally, and the utterance secondarily signifies 
the same thing, to such an extent that once an utterance is instituted22 to signi-
fy something signified by a concept in the mind, if that concept were to 5 
change its significate, the utterance itself would by that fact, without any new 
institution, change its significate. 
(8) The Philosopher says as much when he says that utterances are 
“the marks of the passions that are in the soul”.23 Boethius too means the same 
thing when he says that utterances “signify” concepts.24 And, in general, all 10 
authors, when they say that all utterances “signify” passions [of the soul] or 
are the “marks” of those [passions], mean nothing else but that the utterances 
are signs secondarily signifying what are primarily conveyed by passions of 
the soul (although some utterances do primarily convey passions of the soul or 
concepts that other intentions in the soul nevertheless convey secondarily, as 15 
will be shown below25). 
(9) What was [just] said about utterances with respect to passions or 
intentions or concepts is to be maintained in the same way, analogously, for 
present purposes, for [terms] that are in writing with respect to utterances. 
(10) Now certain differences are found among these [kinds of] terms. 20 
One is that a concept or passion of the soul signifies naturally whatever it sig-
nifies. But a spoken or written term signifies nothing except according to arbi-
trary institution. From this there follows another difference, namely that a 
spoken or written term can change its significate at [the user’s] will, but a 
conceived term does not change its significate for anyone’s will. 25 
(11) But because of impudent quibblers, you have to know that ‘sign’ 
is taken in two senses. In one sense, [it is taken] for everything that, when ap-
prehended, makes something else come into cognition, although it does not 
make the mind come to a first cognition of it, as is shown elsewhere,26 but to 
an actual [cognition] after a habitual [one] of it. In this sense, an utterance 30 
does naturally signify, just as any effect naturally signifies at least its cause, 
and just as the barrel-hoop signifies wine in the tavern.27 But I am not talking 
here about ‘sign’ that generally. 
                                                 
21“Imposition” is the act of assigning spoken (and written) expressions to the mental 
correlates they express. See also n.  22 below. 
22‘Institution’ in this sense is just another term for imposition. See n. 21 above. 
23Aristotle, De interpretatione 1, 16a3–4. 
24Boethius, op. cit. PL 64, col. 407C. 
25See Ch. 11, below.  
26William of Ockham, Scriptum in I Sent., d. 3, q. 9, (“Opera theologica,” II; St. 
Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1970), pp. 544ff.  
27This was a common symbol of wine for sale, much as a striped barber’s pole is a 
symbol for a barber shop today. (There’s a story worth telling about that, but I won’t go into 
it here.)  
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(12) In another sense, ‘sign’ is taken for that which makes something 
come into cognition and is apt to supposit for it, or [for what is apt] to be add-
ed to such a thing in a proposition  for instance, syncategoremata and verbs 
and the parts of speech that do not have a definite signification  or that is 
apt to be put together out of such things, like an expression. Taking the word 5 
‘sign’ in this sense, an utterance is not a natural sign of anything [at all]. 
[Chapter 2] 
(1) You have to know that the name ‘term’ is taken in three senses. In 
one sense, everything is called a term that can be the copula or an extreme of a 
categorical proposition (that is, its subject or predicate), or also a determina-10 
tion of an extreme or of the verb [in such a proposition]. In this sense, even a 
proposition can be a term, just as it can be a part of a proposition. For “‘A 
man is an animal” is a true proposition’,28 is true. In it, the whole proposition 
‘A man is an animal’ is the subject and ‘true proposition’ is the predicate. 
(2) In another sense, the name ‘term’ is taken insofar as it is contrasted 15 
with ‘expression’.29 In this sense, every non-complex [word] is called a term. I 
was talking about ‘term’ in this sense in the preceding chapter. 
(3) In a third sense, ‘term’ is taken precisely and more strictly for that 
which, taken significatively, can be the subject or predicate of a proposition. 
In this sense no verb, conjunction, adverb, preposition or interjection is a 20 
term. Many names30 also are not terms [in this sense], such as syncategoremat-
ic names.31 For even though such [words] can be the extremes of propositions 
if they are taken materially or simply,32 nevertheless when they are taken 
significatively they cannot be the extremes of propositions. Thus the expres-
sion “‘Reads” is a verb’ is well-formed and true if the verb ‘reads’ is taken 25 
materially. But if it were taken significatively it would be unintelligible. It is 
the same for such cases as “‘Every” is a name’, “‘Once” is an adverb’, “‘If’ is 
a conjunction’, “‘From” is a preposition’. The Philosopher takes ‘term’ in this 
sense when he defines a term in Prior Analytics I.33 
                                                 
28I have punctuated the sentence according to modern philosophical quotation-
conventions. It should be noted that mediaeval Latin had no quotation marks, so that the 
claim that the proposition ‘A man is an animal’, and not a name of that proposition, is the 
subject of the sentence is easier to see in the Latin. (It is also easier to see in English is you 
think in terms of spoken rather than written language.) Please note that this is not a 
use/mention confusion on Ockham’s part. The theory of “material supposition,” to be dis-
cussed in Ch. 64, below, makes all the necessary distinctions. 
29‘expression’ = oratio. The term is a piece of mediaeval logical vocabulary meaning 
any word-string. 
30“Names” in mediaeval grammatical theory included what we would call adjectives 
as well as nouns. Sometimes pronouns were also included. 
31Ockham is probably thinking of quantifiers like ‘every’. 
32That is, in material of simple supposition. See the discussion in Chs. 63–64, below. 
33Aristotle, Prior Analytics I, 1, 24a16–18. 
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(4) Now not only can one non-complex [word] be a term, taking ‘term’ 
in this [third] sense. A composite of two non-complex [words]  such as the 
composite of an adjective and a substantive, and even the composite of a par-
ticiple and an adverb, or a preposition with its object  can also be a term, 
just as it can be the subject or predicate of a proposition. For in the proposi-5 
tion ‘Every white man is a man’, neither ‘man’ nor ‘white’ is the subject, but 
rather the whole [expression] ‘white man’. Likewise ‘Running quickly is a 
man.’34 Here neither ‘running’ nor ‘quickly’ is the subject, but rather the 
whole [expression] ‘running quickly’. 
(5) You have to know that not only can a name taken in the nomina-10 
tive be a term, but an oblique [form] can also be a term. For it can be the sub-
ject of a proposition, and a predicate too. Yet an oblique [form] cannot be a 
subject with respect to just any verb. For ‘A man’s sees the ass’ is not well-
formed, although ‘A man’s is the ass’35 is well-formed. But how and with re-
spect to which verbs an oblique [form] can be the subject, and with respect to 15 
which ones not  that belongs to the grammarian, whose job is to consider 
the constructions of words. 
[Chapter 3] 
(1) Now that we have seen the equivocation in the name ‘term’, we 
must follow up with the division of the non-complex term. Thus, not only is 20 
the non-complex term divided into the spoken, written and conceived term. 
Each branch is also subdivided by similar divisions.36 For, just as some ut-
terances are names, some are verbs, some belong to the other parts of speech 
(for some are pronouns, some participles, some adverbs, some conjunctions, 
some prepositions), and the case is similar for written [terms], so [too] some 25 
intentions of the soul are names, some [are] verbs, [and] some belong to the 
other parts of speech (for some are pronouns, some adverbs, some conjunc-
tions, some prepositions). 
(2) But a doubt can arise whether there are certain intentions, distinct 
from [mental] verbs, corresponding in the mind to spoken and written partici-30 
ples. [The doubt arises] insofar as there appears [to be] no great need to main-
tain such a plurality of mental terms. For a verb and the verb’s participle taken 
together with the verb ‘is’ always seem to be equivalent in signifying. For this 
reason, just as we do not find the multiplication of synonymous names be-
                                                 
34‘Running quickly is a man’ = Currens velociter est homo. The sense is just ‘A man 
is running quickly’, but Ockham wants to turn it around to get the composite of participle and 
adverb in subject-position. 
35‘A man’s is the ass’ = Hominis est asinus. The sense is that the ass belongs to a 
man. The previous sentence, ‘A man’s sees the ass’ = Hominis videt asinum, which makes no 
sense at all, either in Latin or in English. 
36That is, they are similar to one another, not to the division into spoken, written and 
conceived. 
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cause of the needs of signification, but rather for the decoration of speech or 
[some] other similar accidental cause (for whatever is signified by [several] 
synonymous names can be expressed well enough by one of them), and there-
fore a multitude of concepts does not correspond to such a plurality of syno-
nyms, so [too] it seems that we do not find the distinction between spoken 5 
verbs and participles because of the needs of expression. For this reason, it 
seems that there need not be distinct concepts in the mind corresponding to 
spoken participles.37 A similar doubt could arise about pronouns.38 
(3) Now there is a difference between mental and spoken names. For 
although all the grammatical accidents39 that belong to mental names also be-10 
long to spoken names, it does not go the other way around. Rather, some 
[grammatical accidents] are common to the latter as well as to the former, but 
others are proper to spoken and written names. (For whatever belongs to spo-
ken [names] also [belongs] written ones, and conversely.) 
(4) The accidents common to spoken and mental names are case and 15 
number. For, just as the spoken propositions ‘A man is an animal’ [and] ‘A 
man is not animals’ have distinct predicates, one of which is singular and the 
other plural, so the [two] mental propositions  by one of which the mind, 
before [making] any utterance, says that a man is an animal, and by the other 
it says that a man is not animals  have distinct predicates [too], one of 20 
which can be said to be in the singular number, and the other in the plural. 
Similarly, just as the spoken propositions ‘A man is a man’ and ‘A man is not 
a man’s’ have distinct predicates that vary in case, so analogously [the same 
thing] must be said for the corresponding propositions in the mind. 
(5) Now the accidents proper to spoken and written names are gender 25 
and declension.40 For such accidents do not belong to names on account of the 
needs of signification. Thus also it sometimes happens that two names are 
synonyms, and yet are of different genders and sometimes in different declen-
sions. For this reason, one need not attribute such a multiplicity [of genders 
and declensions] to natural signs.41 Thus, any plurality and variety of such ac-30 
cidents as can belong to synonymous names can be rightly dispensed with in 
mental [names]. 
                                                 
37Of course, the argument might just as well go the other way. Why have mental 
verbs if participles could do just as well? 
38Ockham has in mind the use of pronouns as stand-ins for nouns. Why have the 
pronouns when the nouns would do just as well? Presumably this doubt does not apply to 
demonstrative pronouns (‘That is Socrates’), or to certain uses of relative pronouns. For ex-
ample, in ‘Some man is knocking at the door, and he is shouting very loudly’, there seems to 
be no plausible way to do without the relative pronoun. 
39The notion of “grammatical accidents” will be made clear in the following lines. 
40“Declension” does not here mean “case.” We saw above that case is common to 
spoken, written and mental names. Here “declension” means, for example, belonging to the 
third declension rather than second. Since English lacks declensions, the point cannot be il-
lustrated very well in translation. 
41That is, to concepts. 
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(6) Now as for comparison,42 a difficulty can arise whether it belongs 
only to names instituted by convention.43 But I pass over that, because it is of 
no great use. A similar difficulty could arise over quality,44 which I shall treat 
exhaustively elsewhere.45 
(7) From what has been said above, the careful [reader] can plainly in-5 
fer that, although sometimes one proposition can be verified and another one 
falsified by a mere variation of the terms’ accidents (namely, case, number 
and comparison), but on account of the thing signified,46 nevertheless this 
never happens with gender and declension. For, even though you often have 
to consider gender in order to have well-formedness of an expression (for ex-10 
ample, ‘Homo est albus’ is well-formed, and ‘Homo est alba’ is not well-
formed’,47 and this comes about from a difference of gender alone), neverthe-
less, assuming well-formedness, it does not matter which gender or which de-
clension the subject or predicate belongs to. But one certainly does have to 
consider which number or case the subject or predicate is in, in order to know 15 
whether the proposition is true or false. For ‘A man is an animal’ is true, and 
‘A man is animals’ is false, and so on for other cases. 
(8) Just as there are certain [grammatical] accidents proper to spoken 
and written names, and certain [others] common to [spoken and written 
names] and to mental names, one must say a similar thing about the accidents 20 
of verbs. The common ones are mood, number, tense, voice and person. This 
is clear with mood. For one mental expression corresponds to the spoken ex-
pression ‘Socrates reads’ and another one to ‘Would that Socrates read’. It is 
                                                 
42That is, comparative and superlative degrees. In Latin as in English, comparatives 
and superlatives are sometimes constructed by changing the form of the word  thus, 
‘long/longer/longest’, ‘good/better/best’  and sometimes by adding the distinct words 
‘more’ or ‘most’ to the positive degree. Ockham’s point here is that if mental language con-
tains analogues for ‘more’ and ‘most’, then it doesn’t need to have separate comparative and 
superlative forms for each adjective and adverb. 
43That is, spoken and written names. 
44I am not sure exactly what Ockham has in mind here. The term ‘quality’ some-
times refers to the mood of a verb, but that is treated separately below. Ockham’s editors (p. 
13 n. 3) suggest the distinction between proper names and “appellative” or common names. 
But I hardly think Ockham would want to do without that distinction in mental language, or 
that there could be much doubt about it. 
45I know of no passage where Ockham does this. 
46‘on account of the thing signified’. The apparatus in the edition (p. 13) does not 
show any textual funny business at this point. Nevertheless, I would be much happier if the 
phrase did not exist. The only sense I can make of it is that it is not the variation of grammati-
cal accidents all by themselves that affects the truth value, but rather the semantic conse-
quences of that variation. But, I must admit, if that is all Ockham meant here, he certainly 
picked an awkward way to say it. 
47I’m sorry, but the point cannot be made in English very well. The sentences (or at 
least the first one, which is well-formed) means ‘A man is white’. ‘Homo’ is a masculine 
noun, and so requires the masculine form of the adjective ‘albus’, not the feminine form ‘al-
ba’. Note that, although ‘homo’ is masculine, it does not refer only, or even primarily, to the 
male of the species. Latin has a separate word ‘vir’ for the male. 
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[also] clear with voice. For one mental expression corresponds to the spoken 
expression ‘Socrates loved’ and another one to ‘Socrates is loved’. Yet there 
are only three voices in the mind.48 For we do not find spoken deponents49 and 
common [verbs]50 on account of the needs of signification, since common 
verbs are equivalent to active ones and passive ones, and deponents [are 5 
equivalent] to middle ones and active ones. 
(9) It is also clear with number. For distinct mental expressions cor-
respond to ‘He reads’ [and] ‘They read’. The same thing is clear with tense. 
For distinct mental expressions correspond to ‘You read’ [and] ‘You have 
read’. The same thing is clear with person. For example, different [mental ex-10 
pressions] correspond to ‘He reads’ [and] ‘I read’. 
(10) That we have to posit such mental names, verbs,  adverbs, con-
junctions and prepositions can be shown from the fact that to every spoken 
expression there corresponds a mental [expression] in the mind. Thus, just as 
the parts of the spoken proposition that are imposed51 because of the needs of 15 
signification are distinct, so [too] the corresponding parts of the mental propo-
sition are distinct. For this reason, just as spoken names, verbs, adverbs, con-
junctions and prepositions are necessary for different spoken propositions and 
expressions, so that it is impossible to express everything by means of names 
and verbs alone that can be expressed by means of them together with the oth-20 
er parts of speech, so too similar distinct parts are necessary for mental propo-
sitions. 
(11) The accidents proper to instituted52 verbs are conjugation53 and in-
flection.54 Yet sometimes verbs in different conjugations can be synonymous, 
and similarly verbs of different inflections. 25 
(12) From what has been said [above], the careful [reader] will easily 
recognize what he has to say, analogously, about the other parts of speech and 
their accidents. 
(13) No one should be surprised that I say that some names and verbs 
are mental. Let him first read Boethius’s [Commentary] on the De in-30 
                                                 
48In addition to the usual active and passive voice, Ockham is perhaps thinking of 
the Greek “middle” voice, which Latin does not have. (Nevertheless, how much Ockham 
knew about Greek is unclear.) The Greek middle voice is frequently (but by no means al-
ways) reflexive in meaning. 
49A deponent verb is a verb that is passive in form but active or reflexive (= middle, 
see n. 48 above) in meaning. Deponent verbs are not at all uncommon in Latin.  
50A common verb, as explained later in the sentence, is a verb that has the same 
grammatical forms for both the active and passive senses. I have no idea which verbs these 
would be.  
51See n. 21, above.  
52See n. 22 above.  
53That is, belonging to different conjugations. See n. 40 above.  
54‘inflection’ = figura. I am not sure what the difference is between conjugation and 
inflection here. The distinctions among the various persons, numbers, tenses, etc., of the verb 
are all preserved in mental language, as Ockham has just said.  
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terpretatione,55 and he will find it there. Thus, when Aristotle defines the 
name as well as the verb in terms of an utterance,56 he is taking ‘name’ and 
‘verb’ more strictly there, namely, for the spoken name and verb. 
[Chapter 4] 
(1) The term, both the spoken and the mental one, is divided in still 5 
another way. For some terms are categorematic, others are syncategorematic. 
Categorematic terms have a definite and fixed signification. For instance, the 
name ‘man’ signifies all men, and the name ‘animal’ signifies all animals, and 
the name ‘whiteness’ signifies all whitenesses. 
(2) But syncategorematic terms, such as ‘every’, ‘none’, ‘some’, 10 
‘whole’, ‘besides’, ‘only’, ‘insofar’ and the like, do not have a definite and 
fixed signification. Neither do they signify any things distinct from the things 
signified by categoremata. Indeed just as, in Arabic notation,57 zero put by it-
self signifies nothing, but when added to another digit makes the latter signi-
fy,58 so [too] a syncategorema does not signify anything, properly speaking, 15 
but rather when added to another [term] makes it signify something, or makes 
it supposit in a determined way59 for some thing or things, or exercises some 
other function with respect to the categorema. 
(3) Thus, the syncategorema ‘every’ does not have any fixed signifi-
cate. But when added to ‘man’, it makes the latter stand or supposit actually, 20 
that is, confusedly and distributively,60 for all men. When added to ‘stone’, 
however, it makes the latter stand for all stones. And when added to ‘white-
ness’, it makes the latter stand for all whitenesses. And just as for the 
syncategorema ‘every’, so we have to hold the same thing analogously for the 
others, although distinct jobs belong to distinct syncategoremata, as will be 25 
shown for certain [syncategoremata] below.61 
                                                 
55Boethius, In librum De interpretatione, ed. 2a, I, PL 64, cols. 405–414.  
56Aristotle, De interpretatione 2, 16a19–21: “A name is an utterance significative by 
convention, no part of which is separately significative.” Also, ibid. 3, 16b6–7: “Now a verb 
is what consignifies time, [no] part of which signifies anything externally.” I translate from 
the Boethian Latin version, L. Minio-Paluello, ed., Aristoteles Latinus II.1–2, (BrugesParis: 
Desclée de Brouwer, 1965). 
57‘Arabic notation’ = algorismo. That is, so called “Arabic numerals.”  
58Better, “affects the latter’s signification.” The other digit (unless it too is a zero) 
has a signification of its own. The point also applies to categoremata and syncategoremata. 
The latter do not make the former signify, as though categoremata did not already have a sig-
nification of their own. Syncategoremata only affect the signification of categoremata.  
59This just means “in a definite way.” It is not a reference to “determinate” sup-
position as defined in Ch. 70, below.  
60See Ch. 70, below.  
61The editors refer to Summa logicae II, 4. But in fact much of the rest of Part II also 
in effect treats this topic.  
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(4) If someone quibbles that the word ‘every’ is significative, [and] 
therefore signifies something, it has to be said that it is not called “significa-
tive” because it determinately signifies something, but rather because it makes 
[something] else signify or supposit or stand for something, as was explained. 
And just as the name ‘every’ determinately and fixedly signifies nothing 5 
[whatever], according to Boethius’ manner of speaking,62 so [too] for all 
syncategoremata and for conjunctions and prepositions generally. 
(5) The situation is different, however, for certain adverbs. For some 
of them do determinately signify things that categorematic names signify, alt-
hough they convey [those things] by another mode of signifying. 10 
[Chapter 5] 
(1) But, setting aside the other parts of speech, we must talk about 
names. First, we have to discuss the division of the name into concrete and 
abstract. 
(2) You must observe that a concrete [name] and its [corresponding] 15 
abstract [form] are names that have a similar beginning vocally, but do not 
have similar endings. For example, it is plain that ‘just’ and ‘justice’, ‘strong’ 
and ‘strength’, ‘animal’ and ‘animality’ begin with a similar letter or syllable, 
but do not end alike. The abstract [form] always, or [at least] frequently, has 
more syllables than [does] the concrete [form], as is apparent in the above ex-20 
amples. Also, in many cases the concrete [form] is an adjective and the ab-
stract [form] a substantive. 
(3) Now there are many kinds of concrete and abstract [names]. Some-
times the concrete [form] signifies some thing (or connotes it or conveys [it] 
or gives [one] to understand it), and even supposits for it, which the abstract 25 
[form] in no way signifies or consequently supposits for in any way. ‘Just’ 
and ‘justice’, ‘white’ and ‘whiteness’, and the like are related in this way. For 
‘just’ truly63 supposits for a man when someone says ‘The just64 is virtuous’. It 
cannot supposit for justice, because justice, even though it is a virtue, is never-
theless not virtuous. But the name ‘justice’ supposits for the quality and not 30 
for a man. It is for this reason that it is impossible to predicate such a concrete 
[term] of the [corresponding] abstract [term]. For such a concrete [term] and 
the [corresponding] abstract [term] always supposit for distinct things. 
(4) For present purposes, there are three kinds of such names, three in-
ferior species as it were.65 The first [kind] occurs when (a) the abstract 35 
                                                 
62Boethius, In librum De interpretatione, ed. 2a, IV, PL 64, cols. 552f.  
63‘Truly’ here does not imply that the proposition is true, but that, in that proposi-
tion, the term really does supposit for a man.  
64That is, someone who is just.  
65The species are inferior to the first main subdivision of concrete and abstract 
names, described in para. 3. The second, third and fourth main subdivisions are treated in 
Chs. 6–7, 8 and 9, respectively.  
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supposits for an accident or [for] any form whatever that really inheres in a 
subject, and the concrete supposits for the subject of the same accident or 
form, or (b) conversely. The first way (a) holds for ‘whiteness/white’, 
‘heat/hot’, ‘knowing/knowledge’ (speaking about creatures66), and so on for 
other cases. In all such cases, the abstract supposits for an accident inhering in 5 
a subject, and the concrete supposits for the subject of the same accident. But 
(b) it happens the other way around in ‘fire/fiery’. For ‘fire’ supposits for the 
subject, and ‘fiery’, which is the concrete [form, supposits] for its accident. 
For we say that heat is fiery, and not [that it is] fire. Similarly, we say that 
knowledge is human and not [that knowledge is] a man. 10 
(5) The second [kind] of such names occurs when the concrete sup-
posits for a part and the abstract [supposits] for the whole, or conversely. For 
example, in ‘soul/besouled’67. For man is besouled and not a soul. So 
‘besouled’ supposits for a man, and ‘soul’ [supposits] for a part of him. But in 
‘A soul is human’ and ‘A soul is not a man’, ‘man’, which is the abstract,68 15 
supposits for the whole, and ‘human’ for the soul, which is a part. 
(6) Now notice that sometimes the same concrete [name] is taken 
equivocally. For sometimes it belongs to the first as well as [to] the second 
kind. For example, the name ‘besouled’ can supposit for a whole, because we 
say that a man is besouled.69 It can also supposit for a subject that receives a 20 
soul, because we say that a body, which is the other part of the [human] com-
posite, is besouled.70 And just as with this name, so with many other [names] 
that can be taken equivocally [in this way]. 
(7) The third kind of such [concrete and abstract] names arises when 
the concrete and the abstract supposit for different things, neither of which is 25 
the subject or a part of the other. This can happen in many ways. For such 
things are sometimes related as cause and effect (for example, we say that this 
work is human, and not [that it is] a man), sometimes as sign and signified 
(for example, we say that the [specific] difference of man is an essential dif-
ference,71 not because it is an essence but because it is a sign of some part of 30 
the essence72), sometimes as location and located (for example, we say that he 
is English, and not [that he is] England).  This can also happen in many other 
way, which I leave it to clever people to discuss. 
                                                 
66In the case of God, the “knowing” one (= the knower) and the knowledge are iden-
tical, since God is simple and does not consist of metaphysically distinct ingredients.  
67‘besouled’ = animatum = animate.  
68Note that ‘man’ may be an abstract form with respect to ‘human’, but it is a con-
crete form with respect to ‘humanity’ (see Ch. 6, below). (‘Humanity’ is presumably also an 
abstract form with respect to the concrete ‘human’.) So the same term may be both abstract 
and concrete, but with respect to different other terms. See the end of para. 9 below.  
69In this case, it belongs to the first kind, as in para. 4.  
70In this case, it belongs to the second kind, as in para. 5.  
71This is a reference to the classical notion of species as being defined by genus + 
difference. Thus, man = animal + rational.  
72Ockham is here thinking of the term ‘rational’, which signifies part of the essence.  
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(8) Just as, in the first two cases, some concrete [term] supposits for a 
part or for a form and the abstract [form supposits] for the whole or the sub-
ject, and sometimes it happens the other way around, so [too] in the present 
case. For sometimes the concrete [form] supposits for the effect or the 
significate and the abstract [form] for the cause or the sign, and sometimes the 5 
other way around. So [too] for the other [subdivisions] under this mode. 
(9) Just as it can happen that the same name is a concrete [form] in 
[each of] the first two modes, but then it is taken equivocally,73 so it can hap-
pen that the same concrete [term] is concrete in the first mode and the third. 
Indeed, it can be concrete in all three modes. Therefore, these three modes 10 
inferior to the first principal mode74 are not distinguished in such a way that 
the one of them is universally denied of the other, but in such a way that each 
of them is separated from the other by particular cases. This suffices for the 
distinction among such modes. Similarly, there is nothing wrong with the 
same name’s being [both] concrete and abstract, with respect to different 15 
things. 
(10) You should know that sometimes we have the equivalent of a 
concrete [term], for which there is nevertheless no corresponding abstract 
[form] because of the poverty of names. This is the case for the name ‘zeal-
ous’, when it is taken for the virtuous.75 20 
[Chapter 6] 
(1) In addition to the above mode of concrete and abstract names, there 
are many others. One of these [other modes] is that the concrete name and the 
[corresponding] abstract are sometimes synonymous. But, in order not to pro-
ceed in an ambiguous way, you have to know that the name ‘synonym’ is tak-25 
en in two senses: strictly and broadly. Those synonyms are strictly so called 
which all users intend to use for the same [thing]. I am not talking about syn-
onyms in this sense here. Those synonyms are broadly so called which simply 
signify the same [thing] in all ways, so that nothing is signified in any way by 
the one [synonym] unless it is signified in the same way by the other, even 30 
though not all users believe them to signify the same [thing] but rather, under 
a deception, they judge something to be signified by the one that is not signi-
fied by the other. For example, if someone should judge that the name ‘God’ 
                                                 
73See para. 6.  
74The first principal mode is described in para. 3. See n. 65 above.  
75Just take Ockham’s word for it that you can do this in Latin. The word is 
‘studiosus’. The point us that ‘studiosus’ can mean “virtuous,” but the abstract form ‘studium’ 
cannot mean “virtue.” Neither of these is included among the range of meanings given by my 
dictionaries, but Ockham knew the Latin of his day better than I do.  
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conveyed a whole and ‘deity’ a part of it.76 I intend to use the name ‘synonym’ 
in this second sense in this chapter and in many others. 
(2) I say that a concrete [name] and the [corresponding] abstract 
[name] are sometimes synonyms. For example, according to the Philosopher’s 
view,77 ‘God’ and ‘deity’, ‘man’ and ‘humanity’, ‘animal’ and ‘animality’, 5 
‘horse’ and ‘horsehood’. It is for this reason that we have many names like 
these concrete [terms], but not [many] like the abstract [terms]. For although 
the authoritative [writers] often use the name ‘humanity’ and the name 
‘animality’, and sometimes the name ‘horsehood’ (which correspond as ab-
stracts to the names ‘man’, ‘animal’, ‘horse’ [respectively]), nevertheless 10 
names like ‘cowship’, ‘asininity’, ‘goathood’, ‘whitenesshood’, ‘black-
nesshood’, ‘colorship’, ‘sweetnesshood’ are rarely or never found  even 
though we frequently use the names ‘cow’, ‘ass’, ‘goat’, ‘whiteness’, ‘black-
ness’, ‘sweetness’, ‘color’. 
(3) Indeed, just as among the ancient philosophers the names 15 
‘heat/hotness’, ‘cold78/coldness’ are synonyms, so [too] ‘horse/horsehood’, 
‘man/humanity’ were synonyms for them. They did not bother in such cases 
to distinguish between concrete and abstract names with respect to their signi-
fication, even though the one [of the terms] had more syllables and the [syn-
tactical] form of abstract [names] in the first of the above senses,79 and the 20 
other one did not but instead [had] more the [syntactical] form of concrete 
[names] in the first of the above senses.80 They employed a diversity of such 
names only for the sake of decorating their speech or for some other acci-
dental reason, just as [they employed] synonyms [only for some such acci-
dental reason]. 25 
(4) According to the Philosopher’s and the Commentator’s81 view, un-
der this mode of concrete and abstract names there are included all names of 
substances and the abstract [forms that are] constructed from them and 
supposit neither for an accident nor for a part nor for the whole of what is 
conveyed by the name [that is] concrete in form nor for anything disparate 30 
from [that whole]. According to those [people], ‘animality’, ‘horsehood’, and 
such are like this. For ‘animality’ does not supposit for any accident of an an-
imal, or for a part [of an animal], or for any whole such that part of it is an an-
imal, or for any extrinsic thing totally distinct from an animal. 
                                                 
76That is, if someone were to think that ‘divinity’ did not signify God, but only the 
essence or nature of God. For Ockham, this is an erroneous distinction, and the terms ‘God’ 
and ‘divinity’ signify the same thing in every way.  
77But see Ch. 7.  
78‘cold’ = frigus, i. e., the noun rather than the adjective.  
79Presumably this refers to the kind of concretes and abstracts discussed in Ch. 5, pa-
ra. 3, above.  
80Ditto.  
81The “Commentator” on Aristotle is Averroes.  
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(5) All abstract names grouped together in the category of quantity, 
and all names that are the proper attributes82 of what are contained in the cate-
gory of quantity, are also contained under [this] same mode. This [is true] ac-
cording to the view of those who maintain that quantity is not a thing other 
than substance and quality,83 but not according to the view of those who main-5 
tain that quantity is an absolute thing really distinct from substance and from 
quality. Thus, according to the former view, ‘quantum’ and ‘quantity’ are 
synonymous, and likewise ‘long’ and ‘length’, ‘broad’ and ‘breadth’, ‘deep’ 
and ‘depth’, ‘plural’ and ‘plurality’, and so on. 
(6) All concrete and abstract names that pertain to shape are reduced to 10 
[this] same mode, according to the view of those who maintain that shape is 
not a thing other than quantity (that is, than substance and quality),84 and so 
[too] for the other species of quantity. Thus, they have to maintain that ‘shape’ 
and ‘shaped’, ‘straight’ and ‘straightness’, ‘curved’ and ‘curvedness’‘, ‘hol-
low’ and ‘hollowness’, ‘snub’ and ‘snubness’ ‘angular’ and ‘angle’, ‘convex’ 15 
and ‘convexity’, and the like, are synonymous names. All these [claims] are to 
be understood [as holding only] if none of these names equivalently85 includes 
some word that the other one [of its pair] does not include. 
(7) Not only concrete and abstract names like these are synonyms, as 
those who hold such a view have to say, but also, according to the view of 20 
those who maintain that a relation is not another thing really distinct from ab-
solute things,86 concrete and abstract relative [terms] are synonymous names. 
For example, ‘father’ and ‘fatherhood’, ‘like’ and ‘likeness’, ‘cause’ and ‘cau-
sality’, ‘potency’ and ‘potentiality’, ‘risible’ and ‘risibility’, ‘capable’ and 
‘capacity’, ‘double’ and ‘doubleness’, ‘calefactive’ and ‘calefactivity’, and so 25 
on. 
(8) Nevertheless, those who hold this view of relation could keep such 
concrete and abstract [terms] from being synonymous names by maintaining 
that the abstract [form] supposited for two [things] at once. For example, that 
‘similitude’ supposit for two similar things. In that sense, ‘A similar is a simil-30 
itude’ would be false, and yet ‘Similars are a similitude’ would be true. 
(9) In [another] way too, all those who hold the above views87 could 
keep it so that no such concrete and abstract names are synonymous. This will 
be discussed below.88 In that case, they could say that in such instances it is 
always false to predicate the concrete [form] of the abstract [form]. But those 35 
who hold the above views and refuse89 to adopt the manner of speaking be-
                                                 
82‘proper attributes’ = propriae passiones.  
83Ockham himself maintains this.  
84Again, this is Ockham’s own view.  
85That is, implicitly.  
86Again, this is Ockham’s own view.  
87In para. 4–8.  
88See Ch. 8, below.  
89Conjecturing ‘nolunt’ for the edition’s ‘volunt’ (line 83).  
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low,90 ought in all such cases  if they are speaking consistently  to grant 
the concrete’s being predicated of the abstract, and conversely. 
(10) Thus, those who hold the first view91 have to grant the following 
predications: ‘A man is a humanity’, ‘An animal is an animality’. Con-
sequently, they have to grant: ‘A humanity runs’, ‘An animality is white’, and 5 
so on. [Those who] hold the second [view]92 also have to grant such proposi-
tions as ‘A substance is a quality’, ‘A substance is a quantity’, ‘A substance is 
a length’, ‘A quality is a breadth’. Consequently, ‘A quantity runs’, ‘A length 
argues’, ‘A breadth speaks’, and so on, [must likewise be granted]. [Those 
who] hold the third [view]93 have to grant ‘A relation is a substance’, ‘A quali-10 
ty is a relation’, ‘A man is a relation’, ‘A likeness runs’, ‘A fatherhood is a 
filiation’, ‘A likeness is a doubleness’, and so on. 
(11) Now it will be shown later94 how those [people] who grant the ba-
ses of the former views could deny such propositions.  In that way too, they 
could deny propositions like ‘Matter is a privation’, ‘Air is a shadow’, ‘A man 15 
is a blindness’, ‘A soul is original sin’, ‘A soul is an ignorance’, ‘A man is a 
negation’, ‘The body of Christ is a death’  despite the fact that
                                                 
90That is, in Ch. 8.  
91In para. 4, above.  
92In para. 5–6, above.  
93In para. 7–8, above.  
94See Ch. 8, below.  
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some people95 would grant that ‘privation’, ‘shadow’, ‘blindness’ and the like 
do not convey anything on the part of reality distinct in any way from [their] 
subject  that is, from a man, matter, and the like. 
[Chapter 7] 
[Ch. 7 argues that not all concrete substance terms and their 5 
abstract correlates are synonymous according to the truth of 
theology. The difference concerns certain propositions per-
taining to the doctrine of the Incarnation. I have not translated 
this chapter here.] 
[Chapter 8] 10 
(1) Now that we have treated certain matters that seemed irrelevant to 
our principal concern,96 but necessary nevertheless, we shall return to our plan 
and treat of another mode of concrete and abstract names. Some of what was 
said above97 can be made clear on the basis of this [mode]. 
(2) For there are certain abstract names, or there can be at the pleasure 15 
of those who institute [words],98 that equivalently include some 
syncategoremata or some adverbial or other determinations, in such a way the 
abstract [form] is equivalent in signifying to the concrete [form], or to another 
term taken with some syncategorema or some other word or words. For users 
can, if they want, use one word in place of several. For example, in place of 20 
the whole ‘every man’, I could use the word ‘a’, and in place of the whole 
‘only man’, I could use the consonant ‘b’, and so on. If this were done, it 
would be possible that a concrete [term] and the [corresponding] abstract 
[term] would not supposit for distinct things or signify distinct things, and yet 
it would be false to predicate the one of the other, and something would be 25 
predicated of the one and not of the other. For if the abstract [term] ‘humani-
ty’ were equivalent in signifying to the whole ‘man insofar as he is a man’ or 
‘man inasmuch as he is a man’, [then] ‘A man runs’ would be true, and ‘A 
humanity runs’ [would be] false, just as ‘A man insofar as he is a man runs’ is 
false. Likewise, if the name ‘humanity’ were equivalent to the whole ‘man 30 
necessarily’, so that the word ‘humanity’ were put in place of the whole ‘man 
                                                 
95Including Ockham himself. See his Summa Physicorum, Pars I, c. 10: “Yet first it 
must be shown that a privation is not anything imaginable outside the soul [and] distinct from 
matter and form and the composite [of the two].” (Ed. Rome, 1637, 12.)  
96The reference is to Ch. 7, which digressed on certain theological matters.  
97See Ch. 6, para. 6, and the end of Ch. 6, para. 9, above.  
98The so called “impositor” imposes or institutes words arbitrarily to perform certain 
linguistic tasks.  
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necessarily’, [then] ‘A humanity is a man’ would be false, just as ‘A man nec-
essarily is a man’ is false. For no man is necessarily a man, but only contin-
gently.99 In the same way, ‘A humanity is white’ is false, just as ‘A man nec-
essarily is white’ is false. 
(3) In this way, whenever one wishes, he can keep it so that a concrete 5 
[term] and [its corresponding] abstract [term] do not signify distinct things or 
supposit for distinct things, and nevertheless that it is simply false to predicate 
the one of the other, and that something is predicated of the one that is not 
predicated of the other. So some [people]100 could say that quantity is not a 
thing distinct from substance and quality, and yet each of ‘A substance is a 10 
quantity’ [and] ‘A quality is a quantity’ is false. For if the name ‘quantity’ 
were equivalent in signifying to the whole [expression] ‘necessarily a quan-
tum as long as it remains in the natural world’, or something like that, [then] 
‘A substance is a quantity’ would be false, even when maintaining the [above] 
opinion, just as ‘A substance necessarily is a quantum as long as it remains in 15 
the natural world’ is false. What is said about this example can be said about 
many others [too], both in divine matters and in the case of creatures. 
(4) For in some such way one could keep it so that the divine essence 
and understanding and will are in no way distinguished in God, and [yet] 
‘God understands by [his] intellect’ would be true and ‘God understands by 20 
[his] will’ [would be] false. Likewise, it could be said that the soul is in no 
way distinguished from the intellect and the will, and yet ‘The understanding 
understands’ would be true and ‘The will understands’ would not. And so on 
for many other cases. 
(5) Thus, in such cases I think there is more a verbal difficulty that de-25 
pends on logic [for its solution] than [there is] a real [difficulty]. For this rea-
son, those who know no logic have uselessly filled up innumerable volumes 
concerning such matters, making a difficulty where there is none, and forsak-
ing the difficulty they ought to be investigating. 
(6) But notice that, even though in common speech such abstract 30 
[terms] equivalent in signifying to many such words rarely or never have 
[any] place, nevertheless in the sayings of the philosophers and saints, fa-
miliar abstract [terms] are frequently found to be taken in this way. Thus, Av-
icenna, Metaphysics V,101 takes [the term ‘horsehood’] like this when he says, 
“Horsehood is nothing other than horsehood only; for by itself it is neither one 35 
nor many, neither existing in these sensibles nor in the soul.” He meant noth-
ing else than that ‘horse’ is not defined by ‘one’ or by ‘many’, or by ‘being in 
the soul’ or by ‘being in external reality’, so that none of these [expressions] 
occurs in its definition. And so he meant that the name ‘horsehood’, as he was 
                                                 
99This is not to suggest that the man might be something else, but only that his exist-
ence at all is a contingent affair.  
100Including Ockham himself. See Ch. 44.  
101Avicenna, Metaphysics V, c. 1 (ed. Venice 1508, fol. 86va).  
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then using it, would be equivalent in signifying to many words, whether they 
are uttered all together or with a verb and copula in between. Thus, he did not 
mean that horsehood would be some thing, and nevertheless that this thing 
would not really be one or many, neither actually102 outside the soul nor in the 
soul. For that is impossible and absurd. Rather he meant that nothing like 5 
that103 occurs in its definition. That this is what he meant is clear enough to 
anyone who looks at his words. Thus, he says,104 
Since this (understand “universal”) is man or horse, it is an in-
tention other [than and] beyond the intention of universality, 
and is humanity or horsehood. For the definition of horsehood 10 
is over and above the definition of universality. Neither is uni-
versality contained in the definition of horsehood. For 
horsehood has a definition that does not need universality. 
(7) From these and other words of his, which I omit for the sake of 
brevity, it is clear enough that he means no more than that nothing like this 15 
occurs in the definition of ‘horse’ or ‘horsehood’. Thus, he means that in the 
above quotation the name ‘horsehood’ is equivalent in signifying to many 
words. For otherwise it would not follow: “One and many and the like do not 
occur in the definition of horsehood; therefore, horsehood is not one”, just as 
it does not follow: “White does not occur in the definition of man; therefore, a 20 
man is not white.” 
(8) From what has been said above, the following mode of arguing, 
which appears to by syllogistic, can be blocked, according to one view105: 
“Every absolute thing is a substance or a quality; quantity is an absolute thing; 
therefore, quantity is a substance or a quality”, just as the mode of arguing: 25 
“Every B is A; C is B; therefore, C is A” can be blocked when these letters are 
instituted in another way. For if ‘B’ signifies the same as [does] ‘man’, and 
‘A’ the same as [does] ‘animal’, and ‘C’ the same as the whole ‘only a risible’, 
so that it is always permissible to put the letter ‘C’ in place of the whole ‘only 
a risible’, and conversely, then, just as it does not follow: “Every man is an 30 
animal; only a risible is a man; therefore, only a risible is an animal”, so [too] 
it does not follow: “Every B is A; C is B; therefore, C is A.” And so by means 
of this mode of [analyzing] abstract names, many sayings of the authoritative 
[writers] can be preserved, although they seem to be false literally. 
(9) Now not only can an abstract [term] be equivalent in signifying to 35 
many words in this way. This [feature] can also belong to concrete [terms] 
and to other words. Thus, those skilled in logic grant that the sign ‘whole’ in-
                                                 
102‘actually’ = in effectu. The phrase is derived from the Latin translations of the 
Muslim philosophers.  
103That is, like ‘one’ or ‘many’, like ‘being outside the soul’ or ‘being in the soul’.  
104Ibid. The parenthetical insertion is Ockham’s.  
105Ockham’s own. See Ch. 44.  
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cludes its distributable, so that it is equivalent to saying ‘any part’ when it is 
taken syncategorematically. Hence, ‘The whole Socrates is less than Socrates’ 
is equivalent to ‘Any part of Socrates is less than Socrates’.106 Likewise, the 
sign107 ‘anything’ includes its distributable, so that it is equivalent to ‘every 
being’. For otherwise ‘Anything is a man or a non-man’ would be unintelligi-5 
ble. It is the same way too for many verbs. For when one says ‘curro’,108 the 
first-person pronoun is implicit. So the verb ‘curro’ is equivalent to itself and 
the pronoun. The same thing holds in many other cases. It is necessary above 
all to know this in order to get at the meaning of the authoritative [writers]. 
(10) Not only is one word sometimes equivalent in signifying to many 10 
words, but also, when added to [something] else, the whole that results is 
equivalent to a composite [made up] of several [words]. Among [these com-
ponents] what is added is sometimes changed, either in case or in mood or 
tense. But sometimes it has to be simply removed in resolving and finally ex-
plicating what is conveyed by the expression. Thus, when one says ‘The 15 
whole Socrates is less than Socrates’, if ‘whole’ is taken syn-
categorematically, [the proposition] is equivalent to ‘Any part of Socrates is 
less than Socrates’, where in place of the nominative ‘Socrates’ there occurs 
the oblique form ‘of Socrates’,109 and in place of the word ‘whole’ there occur 
the two words ‘any part’. Thus some [people] would say,110 that the proposi-20 
tion ‘Generation of a form is in an instant’ is equivalent to ‘One part of a form 
is not produced before another, but rather all at once’, where the copula ‘is’ is 
removed.111 
(11) So [too], some [people] can say that ‘Quantity is an absolute 
thing’ is equivalent to ‘Distance between parts, and extension, if it were not a 25 
substance or a quality, would be an absolute thing, if it were in the natural 
world’. If this were so, it would be plain that the following argument would 
not be valid: “Every absolute thing is a substance or a quality; quantity is an 
absolute thing; therefore, quantity is a substance or a quality.” 
(12) Suppose it is said that in this way I could prevent any syllogism 30 
[whatever], by saying that some such [syncategorema] is included in one of 
[its] terms. It must be said [in reply to this] that, in order to know when an ar-
gument is valid, you have to presuppose the significates of the words, and it is 
in accordance with this [knowledge] that you must [then] judge whether the 
argument is a good one or not. Because for many terms it is certain that, ac-35 
                                                 
106So taken, the proposition is of course true.  
107That is, quantifier.  
108I have to do it in Latin, since the point rests on the inflection of Latin verbs for 
person. The word means ‘I run’.  
109This is in the genitive in the Latin.  
110Including Ockham himself. See his Summa Physicorum, Pars IV, c. 1 (ed. cit., pp. 
85f.).  
111The ‘is’ in the English ‘is not produced’ does not appear in the Latin, which has a 
pure passive form here.  
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cording to everyone’s usage, nothing like that is equivalently included, there-
fore it has to be simply granted that the syllogism is valid or not valid, in ac-
cordance with the traditional rules. 
(13) Yet for any proposed argument, the logician could judge whether 
it is valid by resolving [its] terms into their nominal definitions. When this is 5 
done, he can recognize plainly, by rules that are certain, what is to be said 
about it. 
(14) All privative and negative abstract [terms] can be reduced to the 
above mode of abstract names, and also all verbal [names] and many others. 
We shall investigate that below. By means of this mode [of abstract names], 10 
all the following propositions could easily be denied: ‘Matter is a privation’, 
‘Air is a shadow’, ‘A soul is a sin’, and the like. By means of this mode too, 
the following can be kept: ‘God does not make a sin’, ‘God is not the author 
of evil’, and the like. It will be shown in the tract on fallacies112 how infer-
ences like this are not valid: “This is an evil; God makes this; therefore, God 15 
makes an evil.” 
[Chapter 9] 
(1) We still have to discuss another mode of concrete and abstract 
names. Thus, there are certain abstract [names] that only supposit for many 
[things] taken together, although the concrete [forms] can be verified for one 20 
[thing] alone. For example, ‘people’ and ‘popular’, ‘plebs’113 and ‘plebeian’ 
are related [in this way]. Even though any man can be plebeian and popular, 
nevertheless no man can be the plebs or [be] the people. Those114 who main-
tain that number is not a thing other than the numbered things should include 
among such names all the abstract and concrete names of numbers, if any 25 
concrete and abstract [forms] are found among such [names]. Thus, according 
to such a view, it should be granted that men are a number, and many animals 
are a number, and that angles are ternary or quaternary, and so on  unless 
perhaps they want to deny such a predication by saying that such terms are 
equivalent in signifying to many words, in the way stated in the preceding 30 
chapter. 
(2) Let all this suffice about concrete and abstract [names], even 
though perhaps other modes of concrete and abstract names could be given.  
And let no one reproach me if I pass over some [things] in the present work, 
because I do not promise that I shall discuss all [things], and [so] leave noth-35 
ing for the diligent to investigate. Rather, I am going to run through some 
brief matters for the usefulness of simple [people]. 
                                                 
112Ockham, Summa logicae III–4, c. 6. 
113That is, the common people. I have to leave it in Latin in order to make the rela-
tion to ‘plebeian’ plain.  
114Including Ockham himself. See the end of Ch. 44.  
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[Chapter 10] 
(1) After discussing concrete and abstract names, we now have to 
speak about another division among the names scholastics often use. Thus, 
you have to know that certain names are merely absolute [and] others are con-
notative. Merely absolute names are those that do not signify something prin-5 
cipally and [something] else, or even the same [thing], secondarily. Rather, 
whatever is signified by the name is signified equally primarily [by it]. For 
example, it is clear with the name ‘animal’ that it does not signify [anything] 
but cattle, asses and men, and so on for other animals. It does not signify one 
[animal] primarily and another one secondarily in such a way that something 10 
has to be signified in the nominative and [something] else in an oblique 
[case]. Neither in the definition expressing what the name means115 do there 
have to occur such distinct [terms] in different cases, or an adjectival verb.116 
(2) In fact, properly speaking, such117 names do not have a definition 
expressing what the name means. For, properly speaking, for a name that has 15 
a definition expressing what the name means, there is [only] one definition 
explicating what the name means  that is, in such a way that for such a 
name there are not several expressions expressing what the name means [and] 
having distinct parts, one of which signifies something that is not conveyed in 
the same way by some part of the other expression. Instead, such names,118 20 
insofar as what they mean is concerned, can be explicated after a fashion by 
several expressions that do not signify the same things by their119 parts. And 
so none of those [expressions] is properly a definition expressing what the 
name means. 
(3) For example, ‘angel’ is a merely absolute name (at least if it is not 25 
the name of a job, but of the substance120 only). For this name there is not 
some one definition expressing what the name means. For one [person] ex-
plains what this name means by saying “I understand by an angel a substance 
abstracted from matter”, another [person] by “An angel is an intellectual and 
incorruptible substance”, and [yet] another [person] by “An angel is a simple 30 
substance that does not enter into composition with [anything] else”.121 The 
                                                 
115‘definition expressing what the name means’. That is, the “nominal definition.” 
‘What the name means’ = quid nominis, literally, the “what of the name.”  
116An adjectival verb is any verb besides the forms of ‘to be’.  
117That is, merely absolute.  
118Ditto.  
119That is, the expressions’.  
120Etymologically, ‘angel’ just means “messenger.” Ockham’s point is that we want 
a name here for a certain kind of substance, not a job description that that kind of substance 
happens to fill.  
121Unlike human souls, which are also simple substances, but which do enter into 
composition with something else, namely, the human body. The result is the composite sub-
stance we call a human being.  
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one [person] explains what the name means just as well as the other [person] 
does. Nevertheless, some term occurring in the one expression signifies some-
thing that is not signified in the same way by [any] term of the other expres-
sion. Therefore, none of them is properly a definition expressing what the 
name means. 5 
(4) And so it is for merely absolute names that, strictly speaking, none 
of them has a definition expressing what the name means. Such names are like 
the following: ‘man’, ‘animal’,  ‘goat’, ‘stone’, ‘tree’, ‘fire’, ‘earth’, ‘water’, 
‘heaven’, ‘whiteness’, ‘blackness’, ‘heat’, ‘sweetness’, ‘smell’, ‘taste’, and the 
like. 10 
(5) But a connotative name is one that signifies something primarily 
and something secondarily. Such a name does properly have a definition ex-
pressing what the name means. And often you have to put one [term] of that 
definition in the nominative and another [term] in an oblique case. This hap-
pens for the name ‘white’. For ‘white’ has a definition expressing what the 15 
name means, in which one word is put in the nominative and another one in 
an oblique case. Thus, if you ask what the name ‘white’ signifies, you will say 
that [it signifies] the same as [does] the whole expression ‘something in-
formed by122 a whiteness’ or ‘something having a whiteness’. It is clear that 
one part of this expression is put in the nominative and another [part] in an 20 
oblique case. 
(6) Sometimes too a verb can occur in the definition expressing what a 
name means. For instance, if you ask what the name ‘cause’ signifies, it can 
be said that [it signifies] the same as [does] the expression ‘something from 
the being of which [something] else follows’ or ‘something able to produce 25 
[something] else’, or something like that. 
(7) Now such connotative names include all concrete names of the first 
kind (these were discussed in Ch. 5). This is because such concrete [names] 
signify one [thing] in the nominative and another in an oblique case. That is to 
say, in the definition expressing what the name means there should occur one 30 
nominative term, signifying one thing, and another oblique term, signifying 
another thing. This is clear for all [names] like ‘just’, ‘white’, ‘animate’, ‘hu-
man’, and so on. 
(8) Such [connotative] names also include all relative names. For in 
their definition there always occur different [terms] signifying [either] the 35 
same [thing] in different ways or else distinct [things]. This is clear for the 
name ‘similar’. For if ‘similar’ is defined, it should be put like this: “The simi-
lar is something having such a quality as [something] else has”, or it should be 
defined in some [other] way like that. I do not care much about the examples. 
(9) It is clear from this that the common [term] ‘connotative name’ is 40 
superior to the common [term] ‘relative name’. This is so taking the common 
[term] ‘connotative name] in the broadest sense. 
                                                 
122‘informed by’. That is, having the form of.  
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(10) Such [connotative] names also include all names pertaining to the 
category of quantity, according to those123 who maintain that quantity is not 
another thing than substance and quality. For example, ‘body’, according to 
them, should be held [to be] a connotative name. Thus, according to them, it 
should be said that a body is nothing but “some thing having [one] part distant 5 
from [another] part according to length, breadth and depth”. And continuous 
and permanent quantity is nothing but “a thing having [one] part distant from 
[another] part”, in such a way that this is the definition expressing what the 
name means. 
(11) These [people] also have to maintain that ‘figure’, ‘curvedness’, 10 
‘rightness’, ‘length’, ‘breadth’ and the like are connotative names. Indeed, 
those who maintain that every thing is [either] a substance or a quality have to 
hold that all the contents in categories other than substance and quality are 
connotative names. Even certain [names] in the category of quality are conno-
tative, as will be shown below.124 15 
(12) Under these [connotative] names there are also included all such 
[names as] ‘true’, ‘good’, ‘one’, ‘power’, ‘act’, ‘intellect’, ‘intelligible’, ‘will’, 
‘volible’,125 and the like. Thus, in the case of ‘intellect’, you have to know that 
for the meaning of the name it has this: “An intellect is a soul able to under-
stand.” So the soul is signified by the nominative [name], and the act of un-20 
derstanding [is signified] by the other part. On the other hand, the name ‘intel-
ligible’ is a connotative name and signifies the intellect both in the nominative 
and in an oblique case. For its definition is “An intelligible is something ap-
prehensible by an intellect.” Here the intellect is signified by the name ‘some-
thing’. And the intellect is also signified by the oblique [form] ‘by an intel-25 
lect’.126 
(13) The same thing must be said about ‘true’ and ‘good’. For ‘true’, 
which is held [to be] convertible with ‘being’,127 signifies the same [thing] as 
[does] ‘intelligible’.128 ‘Good’ too, which is convertible with ‘being’,129 signi-
                                                 
123Including Ockham himself. See Ch. 44.  
124Ibid. For that matter, certain names in the category of substance can be conno-
tative too. For example, all the names of fictitious or impossible substances, like ‘goat-stag’, 
‘chimera’, and so on.  
125That is, something that can be an object of the will.  
126‘by an intellect. This is one word in the ablative case in Latin.  
127That is, ‘true’ in the “transcendental” sense. In this sense, truth does not belong 
exclusively to propositions. In this sense, we speak of “a true friend,” “a true coin” (as op-
posed to a counterfeit), and so on. In this “transcendental” sense, everything whatever is a 
true something or other, so that ‘true’ is convertible with ‘being’. Of course, Ockham also 
recognizes the narrower sense of ‘true’ that applies only to propositions.  
128This is a traditional but significant claim, going back at least to Parmenides. Eve-
rything that is is (at least in principle) intelligible, and conversely.  
129‘Good’ was also held to be one of the so called “transcendental” terms. They were 
“transcendental” because they “transcended” or went beyond the distinction among the cate-
gories. They “cut across” all the categories.  
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fies the same [thing] as [does] the expression ‘something volible or lovable 
according to right reason’. 
[Chapter 11] 
(1) Now that we have set out the divisions that can belong both to 
terms signifying naturally and also to terms instituted by convention, we have 5 
to talk about certain divisions that belong [only] to terms instituted by conven-
tion. 
(2) The first such division is: Some names signifying by convention 
are names of first imposition, and others are names of second imposition. 
Names of second imposition are names imposed to signify (a) signs instituted 10 
by convention and (b) the [things] that follow on such signs  but only while 
they are signs. 
(3) Nevertheless, the common [term] ‘name of second imposition’ can 
be taken in two senses. [In the first sense, it is taken] broadly. In that sense 
everything that signifies utterances instituted by convention, but only when 15 
they are instituted by convention, is a name of second imposition, whether 
that name is also common to intentions of the soul, which are natural signs, or 
not. Names like ‘name’, ‘pronoun’, ‘conjunction’, ‘verb’, ‘case’, ‘number’, 
‘mood’, ‘tense’, and the like, are like this  taking these words in the way the 
grammarian uses them. These names are called “names of names”, because 20 
they are imposed to signify only parts of speech, and this only while these 
parts [of speech] are significative. For names that are predicated of utterances 
just as much when they are not significative as when they are significative are 
not called names of second imposition. Therefore, names such as ‘quality’, 
‘pronounced’, ‘utterance’, and the like, even though they signify utterances 25 
instituted by convention and are verified of them, nevertheless because they 
would signify those [utterances] just as much if they were not significative as 
they do now, therefore they are not names of second imposition. But ‘name’ is 
a name of second imposition, because the utterance ‘man’ (or any other) was 
not a name before it was imposed to signify. Likewise, ‘man’s’, before it was 30 
imposed to signify, had no case.130 And so on. 
(4) But in the strict sense, what signifies only signs instituted by con-
vention, in such a way that it cannot be applied to intentions of the soul, 
which are natural signs, is called a “name of second imposition”. ‘Inflec-
tion’,131 ‘conjugation’, and such, are like this. 35 
(5) All names other than these, namely, those that are not names of se-
cond imposition either in the one sense or the other, are called “names of first 
imposition.” 
                                                 
130It is in the genitive in the Latin.  
131‘inflection’. See n. 54, above. 
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(6) Nevertheless, ‘name of first imposition’ can be taken in two senses. 
[In the first sense, it is taken] broadly, and in that sense all names that are not 
names of second imposition are names of first imposition. In this sense, syn-
categorematic signs like ‘every’, ‘no’,132 ‘some’, ‘any’, and the like, are names 
of first imposition. [‘Name of first imposition’] can be taken in another sense 5 
[too], and in that sense only categorematic names that are not names of second 
imposition are called names of first imposition, and syncategorematic names 
[are] not. 
(7) Now names of first imposition, taking ‘name of first imposition’ 
strictly, are of two kinds. Some [of them] are names of first intention, and oth-10 
ers are names of second intention. The names that are precisely imposed to 
signify (a) intentions of the soul, or precisely (b) intentions of the soul, which 
are natural signs, and [also] other signs instituted by convention, or the 
[things] that follow on such signs, are called “names of second intention”. All 
[names] like ‘genus’, ‘species’, ‘universal’, ‘predicable’,133 and so on, are 15 
such names. For these names signify only (a) intentions of the soul, which are 
natural signs, or else (b) signs voluntarily instituted [to signify]. 
(8) Thus, it can be said that the common [term] ‘name of second in-
tention’ can be taken in a strict sense and in a broad sense. In the broad sense, 
what signifies intentions of the soul, which are natural signs, whether or not it 20 
also signifies signs instituted by convention ([but] only while they are signs), 
is called a “name of second intention”. In this sense, some name of second 
intention and of first imposition is also a name of second imposition. But in 
the strict sense, only what precisely signifies intentions of the soul, which are 
natural signs, is called a “name of second intention”. Taken [in] in that sense, 25 
no name of second intention is a name of second imposition. 
(9) All other names than those mentioned are called “names of first 
imposition”, namely, those that signify some things that are not signs or the 
[things] that follow on such signs. All [names] like ‘man’, ‘animal’, ‘Socra-
tes’, ‘Plato’, ‘whiteness’, ‘white’, ‘being’, ‘true’, ‘good’, and such, are like 30 
this. Some of these signify precisely things that are not signs apt to supposit 
for other [things], [and] others signify such signs and other things along with 
that. 
(10) From all these [distinctions], it can be gathered that certain names 
signify precisely signs instituted by convention, and only while they are signs. 35 
But others precisely signify things that are not such signs [and] that are parts 
of a proposition. Some indifferently signify such things as are not parts of a 
proposition or of an expression, and also [signify] such signs [too]. Names 
like ‘thing’, ‘being’, ‘something’, and such, are like this. 
                                                 
132That is, the universal negative quantifier, as in ‘No man is an island’.  
133That is, the five Porphyrian “predicables” described in his Isagoge.  
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[Chapter 12] 
(1) Because it was said in the preceding chapter that some names are 
of first intention and some of second intention, and [because] ignorance of the 
significations of words is for many [people] an occasion for error, therefore 
we must see in passing what a first intention is and what a second [intention 5 
is], and how they are distinguished. 
(2) Now first you have to know that [there is] a certain [something] in 
the soul, apt to signify [something] else, [and] called an “intention of the 
soul”. Thus, as was said earlier,134 in the [same] way that an inscription is a 
secondary sign with respect to utterances (because among all the signs insti-10 
tuted by convention utterances stand in the first rank), so [too] utterances are 
secondary signs of the [things] of which intentions of the soul are the primary 
signs. Aristotle said as much, that utterances are “the marks of the passions 
that are in the soul.”135 
(3) Now what exists in the soul and is a sign of a thing, [and is such 15 
that] a mental proposition is put together out of it in the [same] way that a 
spoken proposition is put together out of utterances, is sometimes called an 
“intention of the soul”, sometimes a “concept of the soul”, sometimes a “pas-
sion of the soul”, sometimes a “likeness of a thing”. In his commentary on the 
De interpretatione, Boethius calls it an “understanding”.136 Thus, he says that 20 
a mental proposition is put together out of “understandings”  not, of course, 
out of the “understandings” that are really intellective souls, but rather out of 
the “understandings” that are certain signs in the soul that signify other 
[things] and [are such that] a mental proposition is put together out of them. 
(4) Hence, whenever someone utters a spoken proposition, he first 25 
forms within [his mind] a mental proposition that belongs to no [spoken] lan-
guage. [This is so] to the extent that many [people] often form propositions 
within [their minds] that nevertheless they do not know how to express, be-
cause of a defect of [their] language. The parts of such mental propositions are 
called “concepts”, “intentions”, “likenesses [of things]” and “understandings”. 30 
(5) But what is it in the soul that is such a sign? 
(6) It must be said that on this point there are different opinions. Some 
[people] say that it is nothing but a certain [something] contrived137 by the 
soul. Others [hold] that it is a certain quality subjectively existing in the soul 
[and] distinct from the act of understanding. [Still] others say that is the act of 35 
                                                 
134See Ch. 3, above.  
135Aristotle, De interpretatione 1, 16a34.  
136Boethius, In librum De interpretatione, ed. 1a, I, PL 64, cols. 297f., and ed. 2a, PL 
64, col. 407. Note that ‘understanding’ in this sense does not mean the faculty or power of 
understanding, but rather an act of understanding, or the result of such an act. See the imme-
diately following lines.  
137‘contrived’ = fictum. This is the famous “fictum”-theory of concepts.  
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understanding. On the side of these last [people], there is the argument that “it 
is idle to bring about through several means what can be brought about 
through fewer”. Now all that can be preserved by maintaining [that the con-
cept is] something distinct from the act of understanding can be preserved 
without [any] such distinct [thing], insofar as suppositing for [something] else 5 
and signifying [something] else can belong just as much to the act of under-
standing as [it can] to another sign. Therefore, one does not have to posit any-
thing else besides the act of understanding. 
(7) We will investigate these opinions below.138 Therefore, let it suf-
fice for now that an “intention” is something in the soul that is a sign naturally 10 
signifying something for which it can supposit or that can be part of a mental 
proposition. 
(8) Now such a sign is of two kinds. One kind is a sign of some thing 
that is not such a sign, whether it signifies such a sign along with this or not. 
This is called a “first intention”. The intention of the soul that is predicable of 15 
all men is like this, and similarly the intention [that is] predicable of all 
whitenesses and [the one predicable of all] blacknesses, and so on. 
(9) Nevertheless, you have to know that ‘first intention’ is taken in two 
senses. In the broad sense, every intentional sign existing in the soul that does 
not signify intentions or signs precisely is called a “first intention”, whether it 20 
is a “sign” taking ‘sign’ strictly for what signifies in such a way that it is apt 
to supposit in a proposition for its significate, or whether it is a “sign” taking 
‘sign’ broadly in the sense in which we say syncategoremata signify. In this 
sense, mental verbs and mental syncategoremata and conjunctions and the like 
can be called “first intentions”. But, strictly, [it is] the mental name that is apt 25 
to supposit for its significate [that] is called a “first intention”. 
(10) Now a “second intention” is one that is a sign of such first in-
tentions. For example, such intentions as ‘genus’, ‘species’, and the like. For 
just as one intention common to all men is predicated of all men by saying 
‘This man is a man’, ‘That man is a man’, and so on, so [too] one intention 30 
common to all intentions that signify and supposit for things is predicated of 
them by saying ‘This species is a species’, ‘That species is a species’, and so 
on. Likewise, by saying ‘Stone is a genus’, ‘Animal is a genus’, ‘Color is a 
genus’, and so on, one intention is predicated of intentions in the way in 
which in ‘Man is a name’, ‘Ass is a name’ ‘Whiteness is a name’, one name is 35 
predicated of different names. 
(11) Therefore, just as names of second imposition signify by con-
vention names of first imposition, so [too] a second intention naturally signi-
fies a first [intention]. And just as a name of first imposition signifies other 
[things] besides names, so [too] a first intention signifies other things than in-40 
tentions. 
                                                 
138See Chs. 14–15 & 40.  
 31
 
(12) It can also be said that ‘second intention’ can be taken strictly for 
an intention that signifies precisely first intentions, or broadly for an intention 
that signifies intentions and [also] signs instituted by convention, if there is 
any such [intention]. 
[Chapter 13] 5 
(1) After the above, [we must] treat the division of terms instituted by 
convention into equivocal, univocal and denominative [terms]. Now although 
Aristotle in the Categories139 treats of equivocals, univocals and de-
nominatives, nevertheless for the present I intend to treat only of univocals 
and equivocals, because denominatives were discussed above.140 10 
(2) First, you must know that only an utterance or other sign instituted 
by convention is equivocal or univocal. Therefore, an intention of the soul, or 
concept, is neither equivocal nor univocal, properly speaking. 
(3) Now an utterance is “equivocal” if it signifies several [things and] 
is not a sign subordinated to one concept, but is instead a sign subordinated to 15 
several concepts or intentions of the soul. This is what Aristotle means141 
when he says that the common name is the same but the substantial notion is 
different. That is, the concepts or intentions of the soul (such as descriptions 
and definitions and even simple concepts) are different, but the utterance is 
one. This is clear explicitly in the case of a word that belongs to different lan-20 
guages. For in the one language it is imposed to signify the same [thing] that 
is signified by such and such a concept, and in the other [language] it is im-
posed to signify the same [thing] that is signified by another concept. And so 
it is subordinated in signifying to several concepts or passions of the soul. 
(4) Now such an equivocal [term] is of two kinds. One kind is equivo-25 
cal by chance, namely, when an utterance is subordinated to several concepts 
and [is subordinated] to the one as if it were not subordinated to the other, and 
signifies one [significate] as if it did not signify the other. This happens with 
the name ‘Socrates’, which is imposed on several men. 
(5) Another kind is equivocal by custom, when an utterance is first 30 
imposed on some thing or things and is subordinated to one concept, and later 
on, on account of some likeness of the first significate to something else or on 
account of some other reason, it is imposed on that other [thing], in such a 
way that it would not be imposed on that other [thing] unless because it was 
first imposed on the former. This is the case with the name ‘man’. For it was 35 
first imposed to signify all rational animals in such a way that it was imposed 
to signify all that is contained under the concept ‘rational animal’. But later 
on, the users, seeing a likeness between such a man and the image of a man, 
                                                 
139Aristotle, Categories, 1, 1a1–15.  
140See Chs. 5–10, above. Nevertheless, Ockham does discuss denominatives at the 
end of the present chapter. See para. 12, below.  
141Aristotle, Categories 1, 1a1–2.  
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sometimes used the name ‘man’ for such an image, so that unless the name 
‘man’ had first been imposed on men, the name ‘man’ would not be used or 
imposed to signify or to stand for such an image. For this reason, it is called 
“equivocal by custom”. 
(6) Now everything that is subordinated to one concept is called “uni-5 
vocal”, whether it signifies several [things] or not. Nevertheless, properly 
speaking, it is not “univocal” unless it signifies, or is apt to signify, several 
things equally primarily, yet in such a way that it does not signify those sever-
al [things] except because one intention of the soul signifies them, so that it is 
a sign subordinated in signifying to one natural sign that is an intention or 10 
concept of the soul. 
(7) This division, however, not only belongs to names but also to 
verbs, and in general to every part of speech. In fact, something can even be 
equivocal insofar as it can belong to different parts of speech  for example, 
[it can be] both a name and a verb, or both a name and a participle or an ad-15 
verb, and so on for the other parts of speech. 
(8) Now you have to understand that this division of terms into equiv-
ocal and univocal is not simply [a division] into opposites so that ‘Some 
equivocal is univocal’ is false. Indeed, it is true. For the same utterance is re-
ally and truly [both] equivocal and univocal, but not with respect to the same 20 
[things], just as the same [man] is [both] a father and a son, but not with re-
spect to the same [man], and the same [thing] is [both] like and unlike, but not 
[like and unlike] the same thing in the same respect. 
(9) Thus, if there is some word that belongs to different languages, it is 
plain that it can be univocal in both languages. Hence, one who knew only the 25 
one language would not [have to] distinguish any proposition in which [the 
word] occurred. But to one who knows both languages, it is equivocal. Thus, 
those who know both languages would in many cases distinguish propositions 
in which such a word occurred. So the same term is univocal to one [person] 
and equivocal to another. 30 
(10) From the above it can be gathered that a univocal [term] does not 
always have one definition. For it is not always properly defined [at all]. 
Therefore, when Aristotle says142 that “univocals are those [things] for which 
the name is in common and the substantial notion [is] the same”, he is taking 
‘notion’143 for the intention of the soul to which the utterance is subordinated 35 
as to a primary sign. 
(11) Now you have to know that ‘univocal’ is taken in two senses. [In 
one sense, it is taken] broadly, for every utterance or sign instituted by con-
vention [and] corresponding to one concept. In another sense it is taken strict-
                                                 
142Aristotle, Categories 1, 1a6–7.  
143‘notion’ = rationem. The term ‘ratio’ frequently means “definition.” Ockham is 
claiming that it does not mean that in this Aristotelian passage.  
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ly, for something like that that is predicable per se in the first mode144 of some 
[things] to which it is univocal, or [predicable] of a pronoun indicating some 
thing. 
(12) ‘Denominative term’, however, can for present [purposes] be tak-
en in two senses. [In one sense, it is taken] strictly, and in that sense a term 5 
that begins as an abstract [term] begins but does not have a similar ending and 
that signifies an accident is called a “denominative term”. For example, 
‘strong’ from ‘strength’, ‘just’ from ‘justice’. In another sense, a term that has 
beginning like an abstract [term] but not a similar ending, whether it signifies 
an accident or not, is called [a “denominative term”] in the broad sense. For 10 
example, ‘besouled’ is said from ‘soul’.145 
(13) Let these [points] suffice for the divisions of terms. Some things 
omitted in the above will be filled in below.146 
 
[Chapter 26] 15 
(1) Since not only do logicians use the above words of second in-
tention,147 but also many other terms of second intention, and also of second 
imposition, often come into use, [therefore,] I now want to treat some of them 
briefly, in order that students not be slowed down in their search for truth on 
account of ignorance of the signification of these [terms]. 20 
(2) Among the terms logicians use, some are common to all universal 
[terms], others are proper to some of them, some belong to some of them tak-
en together, others belong to one [universal term] with respect to another one. 
The terms that belong to several [universal terms] taken together are ‘defini-
tion’ and ‘description’. 25 
(3) ‘Definition’ is taken in two senses. One kind is a real definition,148 
and the other kind is a nominal definition.149 
                                                 
144On the various “modes” of per se predication, see Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, 
4, 73a34–b24.  
145I’m sorry, but in English ‘besouled’ does not begin the same way ‘soul’ does. The 
words are ‘animatus’ and ‘anima’ in the Latin. Those do begin the same way.  
146See Summa logicae III–4, 2–4, on the various kinds of equivocation.  
147In the preceding chapters, Ockham discussed the terms ‘universal’ and ‘singular’ 
(Chs. 14–17), the five Porphyrian “predicables” in general (Ch. 18), and then each of the five 
in turn: ‘individual’ (Ch. 19), ‘genus’ (Ch. 20), ‘species’ (Chs. 21–22, Ch. 22 is on the com-
parison of genus to species), ‘difference’ (Ch. 23), ‘property’ (Ch. 24). and ‘accident’ (Ch. 
25).  
148‘real definition’ = definitio exprimens quid rei = “definition expressing what the 
thing is.” See n. 149 below.  
149‘nominal definition’ = definitio exprimens quid nominis = “definition expressing 
what the name means.” On this notion, see Ch. 10, above.  
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(4) ‘Real definition’ is taken in two senses. [In one sense, it is taken] 
broadly, and in this sense it includes the [real] definition taken strictly, and 
also the descriptive definition. In another sense, the name ‘[real] definition’ is 
taken strictly, and in this sense it is a brief discourse expressing the whole na-
ture of the thing and not indicating anything extrinsic to the defined thing. 5 
(5) This can come about in two ways. Sometimes in such a discourse 
there occur oblique cases [of names] expressing the essential parts of the 
thing. For example, when I define man by saying ‘A man is a substance com-
posed of a body and an intellective soul’. For the oblique [forms] ‘of a body’ 
and ‘of an intellective soul’150 express the parts of the thing. This [kind of def-10 
inition] can be called a “physical definition”. 
(6) There is another [kind of] definition in which no oblique case oc-
curs, but instead the genus is put in the nominative, and likewise the dif-
ference or differences expressing the parts of the defined thing, in the way in 
which ‘white’ expresses whiteness, are put in the nominative. Therefore, just 15 
as ‘white’, even though it expresses a whiteness, nevertheless does not 
supposit for a whiteness but rather only for the subject of a whiteness, so [too] 
the differences [in a definition like this], even though they express parts of the 
thing, nevertheless do not supposit for the parts of the thing, but rather 
[supposit] precisely for the whole composed of those parts. The definition of 20 
man: ‘rational animal’, or ‘rational sensitive151 besouled substance’ is like this. 
For the differences ‘besouled’, ‘sensitive’, [and] ‘rational’ supposit for a man, 
because a man is rational, besouled and sensitive. Nevertheless, they convey  
part of the man, just as the abstract [terms] corresponding to them convey a 
part or parts of a man  although not in the same way. This [kind of defini-25 
tion] can be called a “metaphysical definition”, because the metaphysician 
would define man in this way. 
(7) There can be no other [kind of] definition besides these two, except 
perhaps the [kind such that] each part of it is in more [than the defined] and 
the whole [is] equal [to the defined].152 Therefore, what some [people] say is 30 
ridiculous, that one kind of definition of man is logical, another kind physical, 
[and] another kind metaphysical. For the logician, since he does not treat of 
man insofar as he does not treat of things that are not signs, does not have to 
define man. Rather he has to teach how the other sciences that do treat of man 
should define him. Therefore, the logician should not give any definition of 35 
man, except perhaps by way of example. And in that case the definition that is 
given by way of example should be [either] a physical one or a metaphysical 
one. 
                                                 
150These are both in the genitive in Latin.  
151‘sensitive’. That is, having sensation.  
152That is, each part of the definition has an extension that includes more than the 
defined, but the combination of all the parts exactly fits the defined. On such definitions, see 
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II, 13, 96a24–b14. It is not clear to me that this really constitutes 
a third kind of real definition.  
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(8) And just as it is pointless to say that one kind of definition is phys-
ical, another kind metaphysical, [and] another kind logical, so [too] it is point-
less to say that one kind of man is physical, another kind metaphysical, [and] 
another kind logical. 
(9) Likewise, even though it could be said that one kind of definition 5 
of man is physical [and] another kind metaphysical, on account of the dif-
ference in the parts of these expressions, nevertheless it is completely un-
reasonable and false to claim that one kind of man is physical [and] another 
kind [is] metaphysical. For if one kind of man is physical [and] another kind 
[is] metaphysical, either (a) [this] is understood [in the sense] that there is 10 
some thing outside the soul, some true substance, that is a physical man, and 
another true substance that is a metaphysical man, or else (b) it is understood 
[in the sense] that some concept of the mind or utterance is a physical man 
and another one is a metaphysical [man]. 
(10) The first [alternative] cannot be granted, because I ask how those 15 
[two] men, who are substances, are distinguished. Either (i) the one is a part of 
the other, or (ii) they are certain wholes [that are] in themselves wholly dis-
tinct, or (iii) something is a part of both [of them], even though not everything 
that is a part of the one is a part of the other. The first and second [alterna-
tives] cannot be granted, as is plainly clear. Neither can the third [alternative] 20 
be said, because since a physical man is composed only of matter and form, it 
would have to be the case that either matter or form would not be a part of the 
other of those [two] men. And in that case the one of them, that is, the meta-
physical [man] or the physical one, would be only matter or only form, which 
is absurd. 25 
(11) It does no good to say that the metaphysician considers man in 
one way, and the natural [philosopher] in another, and for this reason man 
considered by the metaphysician is distinguished from man considered by the 
natural [philosopher]. For even if that were the case, it would not follow from 
this that one man would be a metaphysical [man] and another a physical 30 
[man]. Rather, it would follow that there would be only a different con-
sideration of the same man. If Sortes153 sees Plato clearly and Socrates [does 
so] obscurely, [then] even though the one’s vision is different from the oth-
er’s, nevertheless the seen Plato is not different. So [too], even though the 
natural [philosopher’s] and the metaphysician’s consideration of man are dif-35 
ferent, nevertheless the man considered is not different. So, therefore, there is 
not one thing that is a physical man and another that is a metaphysical man. 
(12) Neither can it be said that the concept or utterance is different.154 
For the concept will either be a definition or a part of a definition or some-
                                                 
153‘Sortes’. This is the usual mediaeval form for ‘Socrates’. But in the present ex-
ample, “Sortes” and “Socrates” and plainly meant to be two different people.  
154Alternative (b) in para. 9, above.  
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thing predicable of man. And it is clear that whichever [alternative] is given, it 
is beside the point.155 
(13) From all of this, it is established that definitions can be distinct 
even though the defined is the same. Yet, granted that the definitions are dis-
tinct, nevertheless those definitions signify the same, and whatever is signified 5 
by the one, or by part of the one, is signified by the other, or by part of the 
other, even though the parts differ in [their] mode of signifying because some 
part of the one [definition] is in another case than [is the corresponding] part 
of the other. 
(14) Now you have to know that, even though the defined taken 10 
significatively is predicated of whatever the definition taken significatively is 
predicated of, and conversely, and even though a hypothetical proposition 
made up of the definition and the defined is necessary, and even [a proposi-
tion] about the possible or [a proposition] equivalent to such [a proposition] 
 for example, ‘If it is a man, it is a rational animal’ is necessary, and con-15 
versely, and likewise ‘Every man can be a rational animal’ (taking the subject 
for what can be a man) [is necessary], and conversely  nevertheless no 
such156 affirmative merely assertoric proposition merely about the present is 
necessary. Thus, ‘A man is a rational animal’ is simply contingent, as is ‘A 
man is a substance composed of a body and an intellective soul’. This is be-20 
cause if no man existed, each such [proposition] would be false. Nevertheless 
Aristotle, who claims that ‘A man is an animal’, [and] ‘An ass is an animal’ 
are necessary,157 would maintain that such [propositions] are necessary. 
(15) From the above it can be gathered that the definition is not the 
same as the defined. For, according to everyone, the definition is a discourse, 25 
either mental or spoken or written. Consequently, it is not really the same as 
the thing, or with one word.158 Nevertheless, a definition signifies the same 
[things] as [does] the defined. Those who speak correctly understand it in this 
sense when they say that a definition and the defined are really the same  
that is, they signify the same. 30 
(16) Now you have to know that there is no definition, taken strictly in 
this sense, except of a substance only (as the thing expressed by the defini-
tion). Therefore, taking ‘defined’ for the name convertible with the definition, 
there is such a definition only of names, not of verbs or of the other parts of 
speech. 35 
(17) A nominal definition, on the other hand, is an expression that re-
veals explicitly what is conveyed by a word. For example, someone who 
wants to teach [someone] else what the name ‘white’ signifies says that it sig-
                                                 
155The same argument is meant to apply to utterances.  
156That is, put together out of the definition and the defined.  
157See, for example, Aristotle, Prior Analytics I, 15, 34b16–17: “For of necessity 
man [is an] animal.” For Aristotle, of course, the world is eternal, and species like man and 
ass are not contingent things.  
158That is, the term defined.  
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nifies the same as [does] the expression ‘something having a whiteness’. 
There can be this [kind of] definition not only for names of which ‘to be’ can 
be truly verified in reality,159 but also [for names] of [things] of which such 
predication is impossible. Thus ‘vacuum’, ‘non-being’, ‘impossible’, ‘infi-
nite’, [and] ‘goat-stag’ have definitions. That is, there correspond to these 5 
names certain expressions that signify the same [things] that these words [do]. 
(18) It follows from this that, taking ‘definition’ in this sense, some-
times it is impossible to predicate the definition of the defined by means of the 
verb ‘is’, when both [the definition and the defined] are taken significatively. 
Thus, ‘A chimera is an animal composed of a goat and an ox’ (let that be its 10 
definition160) is impossible. This [is so] because of an impossible implication, 
namely, [the one] by which it is implied [by this proposition] that something 
is composed of a goat and an ox. Nevertheless, the proposition “‘Chimera” 
and “animal composed of a goat and an ox” signify the same [things]’, in 
which the terms supposit materially, is true. By the first [proposition] speakers 15 
generally understand this second one, even though properly speaking it is an-
other [proposition entirely]. Thus, just as, according to Priscian, one word is 
often put for another, as he illustrates in Constructions I,161 so [too] one ex-
pression is often put for another. Nevertheless, the conditional made up of 
such a defined and [its] definition is true. For ‘If something is a chimera, it is 20 
composed of a man and a lion’,162 and conversely, is true. 
(19) Now not only names can be defined by such a [nominal] defi-
nition, but also all the parts of speech can be defined in this way  namely, 
verbs, conjunctions, etc. Adverbs like ‘where’, ‘when’, ‘as many’, [as well as] 
conjunctions and such are defined in this way. In that case, the definition 25 
should not be predicated of the defined by means of the verb ‘is’ when both 
[the definition and the defined] are taken significatively. Rather the whole 
[expression] ‘to signify the same’, or something like that, should be verified 
of those [terms] taken materially, or else another expression should be verified 
of [the defined] when it is taken materially, by saying [for example] ‘Where is 30 
an interrogative adverb of place’, ‘When is an interrogative adverb of time’, 
and so on. 
                                                 
159That is, for names of things that really exist.  
160No one seems to have been completely sure just what a chimera was supposed to 
be. Various definitions like the one here are found in the literature. See, for instance, the defi-
nition at the end of this chapter.  
161Priscian, Institutiones grammaticae, XVII, c. 23, nn. 168–172 (ed. A. Keil, II, pp. 
89–94).  
162See n. 160 above.  
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[Chapter 27] 
(1) A description is a brief discourse made up of accidents and proper-
ties. Hence Damascene says in his Logic, Ch. 14163: “A description is made up 
of accidents, that is of properties and accidents. For example, ‘Man is risible, 
walks upright, [and] has broad nails’. For all these [features] are accidental. 5 
Thus, it is also called a “description”164 as foreshadowing, and not making 
plain the substantial existence of the subject but the consequences [of it].” 
(2) From the words of this authority it is evidently given to be un-
derstood that nothing should occur in a description that is predicated in quid 
or per se in the first mode of the described. In this respect a description differs 10 
from a definition. 
(3) Second, from the cited authority it follows that ‘accident’ is [here] 
taken not only for some thing inhering in another but [also] for [what is] con-
tingently predicable of another, as was said above.165 For since, according to 
the Doctor mentioned, a description is made up of accidents of the subject, 15 
and a description is not made up [of anything] but [what are] predicable of the 
subject, one has to call “accidents” these [items] predicable of the described, 
which can only be concepts or utterances or inscriptions. 
(4) It follows, third, from the aforesaid that a description and the de-
scribed are not always convertible. For since accidents are contingently predi-20 
cated of something, the described [term] can be predicated of something even 
though the description is not predicated of it. Nevertheless, this does not hap-
pen except because of an imperfection of what the described [term] is predi-
                                                 
163John Damascene, Dialectica, in Jacques-Paul Migne, ed. Patrologiae cursus 
completus ... series graeca, 162 vols., Paris: J.P. Migne, 18571866. vol. 94, col. 554B (this 
series is conventionally referred to as the Patrologia graeca, and referred to simply as the 
“PG” — I will do so below); Robert Grosseteste’s Latin version, Ch. 14, (Owen A. Colligan, 
ed., St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1953), p. 16. 
164That is, a “describing.” 
165The distinction Ockham is drawing here is between the metaphysical and the logi-
cal senses of ‘accident’. See Summa logicae, I, 25.2–8, 15–17, 27–30, 34–37: “Philosophers 
define accident as follows: ‘An accident is what is present and absent without corruption of 
the subject’. To make this definition plain, one has to know that ‘accident’ can be taken in 
four senses. In one sense an accident is said [to be] some thing really inhering in a substance, 
in the way in which heat is really in fire and whiteness in a wall. And taking ‘accident’ in this 
sense, the stated definition is made true. … In another sense everything [x] is called an acci-
dent that can be contingently predicated of something [y] in such a way that, keeping the truth 
of the proposition in which being is said of the subject [y] , [x]  can be predicated and not 
predicated of [y]. … In the third sense an accident is said [to be] something predicable that is 
contingently predicated of something, and can be affirmed and denied in succession of the 
same thing either through  a change in what is conveyed by the subject or though a change in 
something else. … Fourth, an accident is said [to be] something predicable that does not con-
vey any absolute thing inhering in a substance, but can be contingently predicated of it, but 
only through a change in what is conveyed by the subject.” 
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cated of. Thus man can be described as follows: “Man is a biped having two 
hands”, adding to it some other [items] that can belong only to man. When 
this is done, the description can be denied of someone lacking hands, [and] yet 
the described [term] is predicated of him. But this is because of the fact that 
the individual [man] is not imperfect. 5 
(5) Nevertheless, it can be said that “description” can be taken in two 
senses, namely: (a) broadly. And this Doctor is talking in this sense about de-
scription. Or it can be taken (b) strictly. And in this sense it is not made up of 
accidents but of properties. And in that sense a description and the described 
are always converted. 10 
[Chapter 28] 
(1) Now a “descriptive definition” is a blend of substantial and acci-
dental [terms]. For example, ‘Man is a rational animal, walks upright [and] 
has broad nails’, according to Damascene as above.166 From this it follows that 
one kind of discourse is made up of [terms] predicable per se in the first 15 
mode, and that is a definition. Another kind [is made up] of what are not pred-
icated per se in the first mode, and sometimes that is a description. Another 
kind is made up of both, and it is a descriptive definition. Yet because every 
definition and every description and every descriptive definition is a dis-
course, therefore no such [definition, description or descriptive definition] is 20 
really the same as the defined or the described, although they signify the 
same. 
[Chapter 29] 
[Ch. 29 distinguishes two senses of the terms ‘defined’ and 
‘described’: (a) the real thing defined or described, and (b) the 25 
word defined or described.] 
[Chapter 30] 
(1) Now that we have talked about terms that are not applicable to any 
one universal [term]  like ‘definition’, ‘description’, and the like (because 
no one universal [term] is a definition or description, but rather each defini-30 
tion and description is put together out of several universal [terms])  we 
now have to talk about terms that are consequent167 on any universal [term]. 
‘Subject’, ‘predicate’ and the like are such terms. 
                                                 
166 See n. 163 above. 
167I am not sure in what sense the following terms are “consequent” on universal 
terms.  
 40
 
(2) As for ‘subject’, first you have to know that, as Damascene says in 
his Logica, Ch. 8168 :  
‘Subject’ is said in two senses, one with respect to existence 
and the other with respect to predication. With respect to ex-
istence, as a substance is subjected to accidents. For they have 5 
being in it, and outside it they do not substand. But with re-
spect to predication, the subject is a particular. 
(3) It can be gathered from this that something is called a “subject” 
because it really substands another thing that inheres in it and really accrues to 
it. In this sense, ‘subject’ is taken in two ways. [In one way, it is taken] strict-10 
ly, and in that sense a “subject” is so called with respect to the accidents really 
inhering in it, without which it is able to subsist. But every thing that 
substands [something] else, whether the thing it substands is a really inhering 
accident or whether it is a substantial form informing the thing to which it ac-
crues, is called a “subject” in the broad sense. In this sense, matter is called a 15 
“subject” with respect to substantial forms. 
(4) But ‘subject’ is said in another sense [too]. For [in this other sense] 
it is the part of a proposition that precedes the copula, of which something is 
predicated. For instance, in the proposition ‘Man is an animal’, ‘man’ is the 
subject, because ‘animal’ is predicated of ‘man’. And ‘subject’ so taken can 20 
be taken in many senses: (a) In one sense, everything that can be put in sub-
ject position in any proposition whatever, true or false, is called a “subject” in 
a broad sense. Thus, any universal [term] can be a subject with respect to 
[any] other, as is plain with propositions like ‘Every animal is an ass’, ‘Every 
whiteness is a crow’, and so on. 25 
(5) ‘Subject’ can be taken in another sense, strictly. In this sense, what 
is put in subject position in a true proposition where there is direct predica-
tion169 is called a “subject”. In this sense ‘man’ is a subject with respect to ‘an-
imal’, but not the other way around. 
(6) In a third sense, more strictly, what is the subject170 in a dem-30 
onstrated conclusion that is known, or is apt to be known, by a science proper-
ly so called is called a “subject”. Taking ‘subject’ in this sense, there are as 
many subjects grouped together in a science as there are conclusions having 
distinct subjects.171 Thus, in logic there are many subjects, and likewise in 
metaphysics and in natural philosophy. 35 
                                                 
168John Damascene, Dialectica, Ch. 16, PG 94, col. 582A; Robert Grosseteste’s Lat-
in version, Ch. 8, (Owen A. Colligan, ed., St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 
1953), p. 10.  
169In direct predication a superior is predicated of its inferior.  
170In senses (a) or (b).  
171Ditto.  
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(7) ‘Subject’ is taken most strictly in [yet] another sense, for some-
thing that is first (by some kind of primacy) among such subjects.172 In this 
sense, sometimes the most common subject among such subjects is called the 
“subject” [of the science], and sometimes the one that is the more perfect, and 
so on for other ways of being primary. 5 
(8) Nevertheless, this is common to all [these kinds of subject],173 that 
each of them is a subject by predication. 
[Chapter 31] 
(1) Just as the part of a proposition that precedes the copula is called 
the “subject”, so [too] the part of a proposition that follows the copula is the 10 
“predicate”. Yet some [people] want to say that the predicate is the copula to-
gether with what follows it. But, because this controversy depends on the sig-
nification of the word [‘predicate’], which is a matter of the user’s con-
ventions, therefore I pass over it now. 
(2) However ‘predicate’ is said,174 it is taken in many senses. In one 15 
sense, everything that is the one extreme of a proposition and is not the sub-
ject [is called the “predicate”]. In this sense, every term that can be predicated 
in a true or false proposition can be a predicate. 
(3) In another sense, ‘predicate’ is taken [for] what is predicated in a 
true proposition in which there is direct predication.175 In this sense, ‘animal’ 20 
is a predicate with respect to ‘man’, but not with respect to ‘stone’. 
(4) In a third sense, what is predicated of some subject by direct predi-
cation, of which subject there can be science properly so called, is called a 
“predicate”. The Philosopher takes ‘predicate’ in this sense in Topics I,176 
where he distinguishes four [kinds of] predicates, namely genus, definition, 25 
property and accident (and includes difference under genus). Species is not 
counted here because, although a species is predicated of individuals, never-
theless because individuals cannot be the subjects in propositions known by 
science properly so called, therefore species is not counted among such predi-
cates. 30 
(5) Now the verb that joins the predicate with the subject is called the 
“copula”. 
                                                 
172That is, among subjects in sense (c).  
173That is, kinds (a)–(d).  
174That is, in whichever of the ways described in para. 1.  
175See n. 169 above.  
176Aristotle, Topics I, 5–6, 101b38–103a5.  
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[Chapter 32] 
[Ch. 32 in on how the predicate can be said to “inhere” in or 
“be in” the subject. Ockham analyzes propositions about the 
predicate’s “being in” or “inhering in” the subject in terms of 
the predicate’s being predicated of the subject.] 5 
[Chapter 33] 
(1) ‘To signify’ is taken in many senses among logicians. In one sense 
a sign is said to “signify” something when it supposits, or is apt to supposit, 
for it  in such a way, that is, that the name is predicated by means of the 
verb ‘is’ of a pronoun pointing to it. Thus, ‘white’ signifies Socrates. For ‘He 10 
is white’ is true, pointing to Socrates. Thus [too], ‘rational’ signifies a man. 
For ‘He is rational’ is true, pointing to a man. And so on for many other con-
crete [terms]. 
(2) ‘To signify’ is taken in another sense when the sign can supposit 
for the [thing] in some proposition about the past or about the future or about 15 
the present, or in some true proposition about a mode. In this sense, ‘white’ 
not only signifies what is now white, but [also] what can be white. For in the 
proposition ‘A white177 can run’, taking the subject for what can be, the sub-
ject supposits for the [things] that can be white. 
(3) Taking ‘to signify’ in the first sense, and [the term] ‘significate’ 20 
corresponding to it, an utterance (and even a concept) often falls away from 
its significate through only a change in the thing. That is, something ceases to 
be signified that was signified earlier. [But] taking ‘to signify’ in the second 
sense, and [the term] ‘significate’ corresponding to it, an utterance or concept 
does not fall away from its significate through only a change in the external 25 
thing. 
(4) ‘To signify’ is taken in [yet] another sense, when that from which 
the utterance is imposed is said to be signified, or what is signified in the first 
sense by a principal concept or a principal utterance.178 In this sense, we say 
that ‘white’ signifies a whiteness because ‘whiteness’ signifies a whiteness. 30 
Nevertheless, the sign ‘white’ does not supposit for this whiteness. So [too], 
‘rational’, if it is a difference, signifies the intellective soul. 
(5) In another sense, ‘to signify’ is taken most broadly when some sign 
that is apt to be a part of a proposition, or is apt to be a proposition or expres-
sion, conveys something, whether principally or secondarily, whether in the 35 
                                                 
177That is, a white thing. Latin often uses the neuter forms of adjectives as though 
they were nouns.  
178‘Principal’ here seems to mean something like ‘absolute’. See the examples.  
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nominative or in an oblique case, whether it gives [one] to understand it, or 
connotes it, or signifies it in any way whatever, or signifies it affirmatively or 
negatively. For example, the name ‘blind’ signifies sight, because [it does so] 
negatively, and the name ‘immaterial’ signifies matter negatively, and the 
name ‘nothing’ or ‘non-something’ signifies something, but negatively. An-5 
selm talks about this way of signifying in On the Fall of the Devil.179 
(6) ‘To signify’, therefore, in one or another signification of [the 
word], belongs to any universal [term whatever]. For “a universal”, according 
to Damascene in his Logic, Ch. 48,180 “is what signifies many [things]  for 
instance, ‘man’, ‘animal’.” For every universal [term] either signifies several 10 
[things] in the first sense or the second, because every universal is predicated 
of several [things], either in an assertoric proposition about the present, or in a 
proposition about the past or future or a mode. 
(7) From this it is clear that those [people] are in error who say that the 
utterance ‘man’ does not signify all men. For, since the universal ‘man’, ac-15 
cording to the above Doctor,181 signifies several [things], and it does not signi-
fy several things that are not men, [therefore] it has to signify several men. 
This is to be granted, because nothing is signified by ‘man’ except a man, and 
no one man any more than another. 
(8) Every universal, therefore, signifies several [things]. But a uni-20 
versal that is a genus or species, which is predicated of a pronoun pointing to 
some thing, does not signify several [things] except by taking ‘to signify’ in 
the first sense or the second sense. But the remaining universals signify sever-
al [things] in the first sense or the second, and some [things] too in the third 
sense or the fourth. For every other universal signifies something in the nomi-25 
native and something in an oblique case. This is clear with ‘rational’ and ‘risi-
ble’, and so on. 
 
[Chapter 63] 
(1) Now that we have talked about the signification of terms, it re-30 
mains to talk about supposition, which is a property that belongs to a term, but 
only when [it occurs] in a proposition. 
(2) Now first, you must know that supposition is taken in two senses, 
namely, broadly and strictly. Taken broadly, it is not distinguished from ap-
pellation. Rather, appellation is contained under supposition. In another sense 35 
                                                 
179Anselm, De casu diaboli, Ch. 11. See Jasper Hopkins & Herbert Richardson, trs., 
Anselm of Canterbury: Truth, Freedom, and Evil. Three Philosophical Dialogues, (New 
York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), pp. 163–168.  
180John Damascene, Dialectica, Ch. 65, PL 94, col. 659A; Latin translation of Rob-
ert Grosseteste, Ch. 48, ed. cit., p. 50.  
181That is, Damascene, ibid.  
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it is taken strictly, insofar as it is distinguished from appellation. But I do not 
intend to speak about supposition in that sense, but rather only in the first 
sense. Thus, both the subject and the predicate supposit. And in general, 
whatever can be the subject or predicate of a proposition supposits. 
(3) Supposition is so called as, so to speak, a “positing for another”,182 5 
in such a way that when a term in a proposition stands for something, so that 
we use the term for something of which (or of a pronoun pointing to it) that 
term (or the nominative of that term, if it is in an oblique case) is verified, it 
supposits for that [thing]. At least this is true when the suppositing term is 
taken significatively. 10 
(4) So in general, a term supposits for that of which (or of a pronoun 
pointing to it) the predicate is denoted by the proposition to be predicated, if 
the suppositing term is the subject. But if the suppositing term is the predicate, 
it is denoted that the subject is in subject position with respect to it (or with 
respect to a pronoun pointing to it) if the proposition is formed.183 For exam-15 
ple, it is denoted by ‘A man is an animal’ that Socrates truly is an animal, so 
that ‘This is an animal’, pointing to Socrates, is true if it is formed. But it is 
denoted by ‘Man is a name’ that the utterance ‘man’ is a name, [and] therefore 
in this [proposition] ‘man’ supposits for the utterance [itself]. Likewise, it is 
denoted by ‘A white184 is an animal’ that the thing that is white is an animal, 20 
so that ‘This is an animal’, pointing to the thing that is white, is true. For this 
reason, the subject “supposits” for that thing. 
(5) So, analogously, it must be said in the case of the predicate. For it 
is denoted by ‘Socrates is white’ that Socrates is this thing that has a white-
ness.185 Therefore, the predicate supposits for this thing that has a whiteness. 25 
And if no thing but Socrates had a whiteness, then the predicate would 
supposit precisely for Socrates. 
(6) Therefore, there is a general rule that a term never supposits for 
anything in any proposition, at least when it is taken significatively, except for 
what it can be truly predicated of. 30 
(7) It follows from this that what some ignorant [people] say is false, 
[namely,] that a concrete [term] on the part of the predicate supposits for a 
form. That is, that in ‘Socrates is white’, [the term] ‘white’ supposits for 
whiteness. For ‘A whiteness is white’ is simply false, however the terms 
supposit. Therefore, such a concrete [term] never supposits for such a form 35 
signified by its [corresponding] abstract [term], according to Aristotle’s 
                                                 
182‘Suppositio’ = ‘sub’ + ‘positio’ = literally, “putting under.”  
183Propositions are tokens for Ockham, so that their existence is very much a contin-
gent matter.  
184That is, a white thing.  
185Ockham is implicitly assuming that the proposition is true.  
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view.186 But this is quite possible for other concrete [terms], which we have 
talked about [above].187 
(8) In the same way, in ‘A man is God’, [the term] ‘man] truly sup-
posits for the Son of God, because he is truly a man.188 
[Chapter 64] 5 
(1) Now you must know that supposition is first divided into personal, 
simple and material supposition. 
(2) Personal supposition, in general, is that [which occurs] when a 
term supposits for its significate, whether that significate is (a) a thing outside 
the soul, whether it is (b) an utterance, or (c) an intention of the soul, whether 10 
it is (d) an inscription, or anything else imaginable. So whenever the subject 
or predicate of a proposition supposits for its significate in such a way that it 
is taken significatively, the supposition is always personal. 
(3) [Here is] an example of the first case, (a): In saying ‘Every man is 
an animal’, ‘man’ supposits for its significates. For ‘man’ is imposed only to 15 
signify these men. For it does not properly signify anything common to them, 
but rather the men themselves, according to Damascene.189 
(4) [Here is] an example of the second case, (b): In saying ‘Every spo-
ken name is a part of speech’, ‘name’ supposits only for utterances. But be-
cause it is imposed to signify those utterances, therefore it supposits per-20 
sonally. 
(5) [Here is] an example of the third case, (c): In saying ‘Every species 
is a universal’ or ‘Every intention of the soul is in the soul’, either subject 
supposits personally. For it supposits for the [things] it was imposed to signi-
fy. 25 
                                                 
186See Ch. 5, above. The remark is odd, and would seem to go more properly with 
the following sentence of the text. The kind of concrete/abstract pairs referred to by the 
‘such’s in this paragraph is the kind discussed in Ch. 5 above. But Aristotle is not mentioned 
there at all. He is mentioned in Ch. 6 in connection with certain pairs of concrete and abstract 
terms, mainly in the category of substance. For those terms, the claim rejected in this para-
graph would hold. (See also Ch. 7, where Ockham departs from the Aristotelian view for cer-
tain theological statements.)  
187In Ch. 6, above. See n. 186 above.  
188The point rests on the theology of the Incarnation. The term ‘man’ here is taken to 
supposit for a person, not for a nature. According to the doctrine, God the Son, the second 
person of the Trinity, is Jesus the man. This one person has two natures, divine and human. If 
‘man’ here supposited for the human nature, the proposition would be false, because that is 
not God. The example does not quite fit the topic, however, since we were talking about con-
crete terms on the part of the predicate. (See para. 7.) But the same point can be made about 
the predicate here. If ‘God’ supposited for the divine nature, the proposition would be false, 
since no human is the divine nature (even though there is one human who is a divine person).  
189John Damascene, Dialectica, Ch. 10, PG 94, col. 571A; Latin version by Robert 
Grosseteste, Ch. 2, n. 8, ed. cit., p. 4.  
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(6) [Here is] an example of the fourth case, (d): In saying ‘Every writ-
ten word is a word’, the subject supposits only for its significates, that is, for 
inscriptions. Therefore, it supposit personally. 
(7) It is clear from this that those who say personal supposition occurs 
when a term supposits for a thing190 are not describing personal supposition 5 
sufficiently. Instead, this is the definition: that personal supposition occurs 
when a term supposits for its significate and [is taken] significatively. 
(8) Simple supposition occurs when a term supposits for an intention 
of the soul, but is not taken significatively. For example, in saying ‘Man is a 
species’, the term ‘man’ supposits for an intention of the soul, because that 10 
intention is a species. Yet the term ‘man’ does not properly speaking signify 
that intention. Rather, the utterance and the intention of the soul are only signs 
subordinated in signifying the same [thing], in the manner explained else-
where.191 
(9) From this it is clear that those [people’s] opinion is false who say 15 
generally that simple supposition occurs when a term supposits for its sig-
nificate.192 For simple supposition occurs when a term supposits for an in-
tention of the soul that is not properly a significate of the term. For such a 
term signifies true things and not intentions of the soul.193 
(10) Material supposition occurs when a term does not supposit 20 
significatively but supposits for an utterance or for an inscription. This is clear 
in ‘Man is a name’. ‘Man’ supposits for itself, and yet it does not signify it-
self. Likewise, in the proposition ‘Man is written’ the supposition can be ma-
terial, because the term supposits for what is written. 
(11) You have to know that, just as this threefold supposition belongs 25 
to a spoken utterance, so [too] can it belong to an inscribed utterance. Thus, if 
the four propositions ‘A man is an animal’, ‘Man is a species’, ‘Man is a 
monosyllabic utterance’, ‘Man is a written word’ are written down, each of 
them can be verified, but only for different things. For what is an animal is in 
no way a species or a monosyllabic utterance or a written word. Likewise, 30 
                                                 
190For example, William of Sherwood. See his Introduction to Logic, Ch. 4, Kretz-
mann, tr., p. 107: “It is personal, however, when a word supposits what it signifies, but for a 
thing that is subordinate [to what it signifies], as in ‘a man is running’ (homo currit); for run-
ning is in man because of some individual (Cursus enim inest homini gratia alicuius 
singularis).” (Kretzmann’s insertions.)  
191See Ch. 1, above. The point is not well put here. It is not that both the utterance 
and the intention of the soul are “subordinated” signs. Rather, the former is subordinated to 
the latter.  
192For example, Walter Burley, The Longer Treatise on the Purity of the Art of Log-
ic, Tract. 1: “On the Properties of Terms,” Part 1, Ch. 3, Spade tr., para. 27–41 (forthcoming). 
See also William of Sherwood, loc. cit.: “It is simple when a word supposits what it signifies 
for what it signifies (supponit significatum pro significato), as in ‘man is a species.”’ (Kretz-
mann’s insertion.)  
193Of course, some terms do signify intentions of the soul. For example, the term ‘in-
tention of the soul’. Ockham is speaking very broadly here.  
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what is a species is not an animal or a monosyllabic utterance, and so on. In 
the last two propositions the term [‘man’] has material supposition. 
(12) But [material supposition] can be subdivided, insofar as [a term in 
material supposition] can supposit for an utterance or for an inscription. If 
there were names imposed [for this purpose], supposition for an utterance and 5 
for an inscription could be distinguished [from one another] just as supposi-
tion for a significate [is distinguished from supposition] for an intention of the 
soul, the one of which we call personal and the other simple. But we do not 
have such names. 
(13) Now just as such a diversity of [kinds of] supposition can belong 10 
to a spoken and a written term, so too can it belong a mental term. For an in-
tention can supposit for what it signifies, for itself, for an utterance and for an 
inscription. 
(14) Now you have to know that supposition is not called “personal” 
because it supposits for a person, or “simple” because it supposits for [some-15 
thing] simple, or “material” because it supposits for matter. Rather, [they are 
so called] for the reasons stated. Therefore, the terms ‘material’, ‘personal’, 
‘simple’ are used equivocally in logic and in the other sciences. Nevertheless, 
they are not often used in logic except with ‘supposition’ added. 
[Chapter 65] 20 
(1) It is to be noted too that a term always, in whatever proposition it 
occurs, can have personal supposition unless it is restricted to another [kind of 
supposition] by a voluntary [agreement] among the users, just as an equivocal 
term can supposit in any proposition for any of its significates unless it is re-
stricted to a definite significate by a voluntary [agreement] among the users. 25 
But a term cannot in every proposition have simple supposition or material, 
but only in a [proposition] where such a term is matched with another extreme 
that pertains to an intention of the soul or to an utterance or an inscription. 
(2) For example, in the proposition ‘A man runs’, [the term] ‘man’ 
cannot have simple or material supposition. For ‘to run’ does not pertain to an 30 
intention of the soul or to an utterance or inscription. But in the proposition 
‘Man is a species’, since ‘species’ signifies an intention of the soul, therefore 
it can have simple supposition. And [in that case] the proposition has to be 
distinguished with respect to the third mode of equivocation,194 insofar as the 
subject can have simple or personal supposition. In the first sense the proposi-35 
tion is true, because then it is denoted that one intention of the soul, or con-
                                                 
194The three modes of equivocation are given by Aristotle at Sophistic Refutations 4, 
166a14–21. The third mode occurs “when words that have a simple sense taken alone have 
more than one meaning in combination; e.g., ‘knowing letters’. For each word, both ‘know-
ing’ and ‘letters’, possibly has a single meaning: but both together have more than one  
either that the letters themselves have knowledge or that someone else has it of them” (Ox-
ford translation).  
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cept, is a species, and that is true. In the second sense, the proposition is just 
false, because then it is denoted that some thing signified by ‘man’ is a spe-
cies, and that is plainly false. 
(3) In the same way ‘Man is predicated of several [things]’, ‘Risible is 
an attribute of man’, ‘Risible is predicated first195 of man’ have to be dis-5 
tinguished. They have to be distinguished both on the part of the subject and 
on the part of the predicate. Likewise, ‘Rational animal is the definition of 
man’ has to be distinguished. For if [‘rational animal’] has simple supposition, 
[the proposition] is true; if personal, it is false. So too for many [other] such 
cases. For instance, for ‘Wisdom is an attribute of God’, ‘Creative is an attrib-10 
ute of God’, ‘Goodness and wisdom are divine attributes’, ‘Goodness is predi-
cated of God’, ‘Unbegottenness is a property of the Father’, and the like.196 
(4) Similarly, when a term is matched [in a proposition] with some ex-
treme that pertains to an utterance or an inscription, the proposition has to be 
distinguished insofar as the term can have personal or material supposition. In 15 
this way, ‘Socrates is a name’, ‘Man is a monosyllabic utterance’, ‘Paternity 
signifies a characteristic of the Father’ have to be distinguished. For if ‘pater-
nity’ supposits materially, then ‘Paternity signifies a characteristic of the Fa-
ther’ is true,197 because the name ‘paternity’ does signify a characteristic of 
the Father. But if it supposits personally, [the proposition] is false, because 20 
paternity [either] is a characteristic of the Father or else [just] is the Father 
himself.198 In this way too, ‘Rational animal signifies the quiddity of man’, 
‘Rational signifies a part of man’, ‘White man signifies an accidental aggre-
gate’, ‘White man is a composite term’, and so on for many [other] such cas-
es, [all] have to be distinguished. 25 
(5) Therefore, the following rule can be given: When a term [that is] 
able to have the above threefold supposition is matched with an extreme 
common to non-complex or complex [expressions], whether spoken or writ-
ten, the term can always have material or personal supposition and such [a 
proposition] has to be distinguished. But when it is matched with an extreme 30 
signifying an intention of the soul, [the proposition] has to be distinguished 
insofar as [the subject] can have simple or personal supposition. When it is 
matched with an extreme common to all the above, then [the proposition] has 
to be distinguished insofar as [the term] can have personal, simple or material 
                                                 
195This sense of “first” is derived from the Aristotelian notion of a “first subject” of 
an attribute. See Posterior Analytics I, 4, 73b25–74a3.  
196Presumably the point is that terms like ‘attribute’ (= attributum, passio) and 
‘property’ (= proprium) signify universals  which for Ockham means that they signify uni-
versal concepts.  
197It would also be true if it supposited simply, since concepts signify too for Ock-
ham.  
198The alternative is added in case you are worried about introducing a distinction in-
to the divine simplicity by suggesting that the characteristic is something the Father has. In 
either case, the point is that paternity, in this sense, does not signify a characteristic of the 
Father.  
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supposition. Thus ‘Man is predicated of several [things]’ has to be distin-
guished. For if ‘man’ has personal supposition, [the proposition] is false, be-
cause then it is denoted [by the proposition] that some thing signified by the 
term ‘man’ is predicated of several [things]. If [the term] has simple or mate-
rial supposition, [the latter] either for an utterance or for an inscription, [then 5 
the proposition] is true, because the common intention, as well as the utter-
ance and what is written down, is predicated of several [things]. 
[Chapter 66] 
(1) But many kinds of objections can be raised against the above 
[claims]. 10 
(2) First, as follows: ‘Man is the worthiest creature among creatures’199 
is true. I ask which kind of supposition ‘man’ has [there]. Not personal, be-
cause each singular [of the proposition] is false. Therefore, it has simple sup-
position.200 But if simple supposition were for an intention of the soul, [the 
proposition] would be false, because an intention of the soul is not the most 15 
worthy of creatures. Therefore, simple supposition is not for an intention of 
the soul. 
(3) Moreover, (b) ‘Color is the first201 object of sight’ is true. But if 
‘object’ [there] has personal supposition, each singular [of the proposition] is 
false. Therefore, [the term] has simple supposition.202 But if it supposited for 20 
an intention of the soul, [the proposition] would be false, because no intention 
of the soul is the first object of sight (for no intention is seen). Therefore, sim-
ple supposition is not for an intention of the soul. 
(4) Likewise, ‘Man is the first203 risible’ is true. And [it is not true] for 
a singular thing or for an intention of the soul. Therefore, [it is true] for some-25 
thing else.204 
(5) The same [thing] can be argued for ‘Being is first205 one’ [and] 
‘God is first206 a person’. For each of them is true, and [it is] not [true] for a 
singular thing or for an intention of the soul. Therefore, [it is true] for some-
thing else. Yet the subject has simple supposition. Therefore, simple supposi-30 
tion is not for an intention of the soul. 
                                                 
199The odd phrase simply means “the worthiest creature of them all.”  
200It goes without saying that it does not have material supposition here.  
201See n. 195 above.  
202Again, material supposition is not a real alternative here.  
203See n. 195 above. 
204And that something else is presumably the universal or common nature man.  
205Again, see n. 195 above. 
206Ditto.  
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(6) Moreover, (c) an utterance is not predicated of an utterance, and an 
intention is not [predicated] of an intention. For in that case every proposition 
like ‘A man is an animal’ would be just false.207 
(7) To (a) the first of these, it must be said that the opinion of those 
who say that in ‘Man is the most worthy of creatures’ the subject has simple 5 
supposition is just false. Indeed, ‘man’ in this [proposition] has personal sup-
position only. 
(8) Neither is their reasoning valid. Instead it counts against them. For 
they prove that if ‘man’ had personal supposition, [the proposition] would in 
that case be false, because each [of its] singulars is false. But this reasoning 10 
counts against them. For if ‘man’ stands simply in this [proposition], and not 
for any singular, therefore [it stands] for something else. Consequently, that 
would be the most worthy of creatures. But that is false, because in that case it 
would be nobler than any man. 
(9) This plainly does count against them. For a common [entity] or a 15 
species is never nobler than its singular, because, according to their manner of 
speaking, the inferior always includes its superior and more [besides]. There-
fore, the common form, since it is a part of this man, is not nobler than this 
man. So if the subject in ‘Man is the most worthy of creatures’ supposited for 
something other than a singular man, [the proposition] would be just false. 20 
(10) Therefore, it has to be said the ‘man’ [in this proposition] sup-
posits personally, and [that the proposition] is literally false, because each [of 
its] singulars is false. Nevertheless, it is true according to the meaning of 
those who maintain [the proposition]. For they do not mean that a man is no-
bler than any creature in general, but that he is nobler than any creature that is 25 
not a man. And this is true among corporeal creatures, although it is not true 
for intellectual substances.208 
(11) So it is often the case that authoritative magisterial propositions 
are false literally, and true in the sense in which they were made. That is, [the 
speakers] meant true propositions by them. That is so in the present case. 30 
(12) To (b) the second [objection], it must be said that every [proposi-
tion] like ‘Color is the first object of sight’, ‘Man is the first risible’, ‘Being is 
first one’, [and] likewise ‘Man is the first rational animal’, ‘The triangle first 
has three angles’, ‘Sound is the first and adequate object of hearing’, and 
many other such [propositions], is just false literally, although the [proposi-35 
tions] the Philosopher meant by them are true. 
(13) Thus, you must know that just as the Philosopher and others often 
take a concrete [term] for the [corresponding] abstract [form] and the other 
way around, [and] likewise sometimes take the plural for the singular and the 
                                                 
207Because it is not true that the utterance ‘man’ is the utterance ‘animal’, or that the 
intention “man” is the intention “animal.”  
208That is, for angels, which are nobler than human beings.  
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other way around, so [too] they often take the exercised act for the signate209 
act and the other way around. Now an “exercised act” is one that is conveyed 
by the verb ‘is’, or something like that, which does not just signify that some-
thing is predicated of something but [actually] exercises [that predication], by 
predicating one [thing] of another and saying ‘A man is an animal’, ‘A man 5 
runs’, ‘A man argues’, and so on. But a “signate” act is one that is conveyed 
by the verb ‘to be predicated’ or ‘to be in subject position’ or ‘to be verified’ 
or ‘to belong to’ and the [other] such [verbs] that signify the same [thing as 
these do]. 
(14) For example, in saying ‘Animal is predicated of man’, animal is 10 
not predicated here of man. For in this proposition ‘animal’ is in subject posi-
tion, and [so] is not predicated. Therefore, the act [here] is a signate one. Say-
ing ‘Animal is predicated of man’ is not the same as saying ‘A man is an ani-
mal’, for the one is multiple210 and the other is not. So too, saying that ‘genus’ 
is predicated of the common [term] ‘man’ is not the same as saying that the 15 
common [term] ‘man’ is a genus.211 Neither is saying ‘Genus is predicated of 
species’ or ‘The utterance “animal” is predicated of the utterance “man”’ the 
same as saying ‘A species is a genus’ or ‘The utterance “man” is the utterance 
“animal”’. For the first two212 are true and the second two213 are false. Yet, de-
spite this, the Philosopher sometimes takes the exercised act for the signate 20 
act, and sometimes the other way around. So do many other [writers]. This 
makes many [people] fall into errors. 
(15) It is like this in the present case. For the proposition ‘Man is the 
first risible’ (taking ‘first’ as the Philosopher takes it in Posterior Analytics 
I214) is as false as is ‘A species is a genus’. But nevertheless, the signate act in 25 
place of which [this proposition] occurs is a simply true one. For example, ‘Of 
man the predicate “risible” is first predicated’ is true. In this signate act both 
‘man’ and ‘risible’ supposit simply for the intention of the soul. For of this 
intention of the soul [“man”] there is first predicated [the intention] “risible”, 
not for itself but for its singulars. This [signate] act should be exercised as 30 
‘Every man is risible and nothing other than a man is risible’.215 So, in the 
signate act ‘man’ supposits simply and for an intention. But in the correspond-
ing exercised act, ‘man’ supposits personally and for singular things. For no 
thing is able to laugh except a singular thing. Therefore, in the signate act the 
non-complex [word] ‘first’ occurs correctly, but in the corresponding exer-35 
                                                 
209‘signate’ = signato. The sense is just “signified.”  
210That is, equivocal. The equivocal one is ‘Animal is predicated of man’, for the 
reason given in Ch. 65, para. 2.  
211The common term ‘man’ is a species, not a genus. But that makes no difference 
for the success of the example.  
212Rather, the first of each pair.  
213Rather, the second of each pair.  
214See n. 195 above. 
215In other words, it should not be exercised as ‘Man is the first risible’.  
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cised act ‘first’ should not occur. And because ‘first’ means the same as “be-
ing predicated universally of something and of nothing but what it is pred-
icated of”,216 therefore two exercised acts should correspond to such a signate 
act.217 
(16) It is like this [too] for ‘Sound is the first and adequate object of 5 
hearing’. For it is literally false, because ‘sound’ either supposits for a sin-
gular thing or for a common thing. If [it supposits] for a singular thing, then 
[the proposition] is false because each [of its] singulars is false. If [the term 
supposits] for a common thing, then it is still false because, according to these 
[people], no common thing is apprehended by sensation. Therefore, [the prop-10 
osition] is simply false literally. 
(17) Nevertheless perhaps, among those who speak in general and un-
derstand correctly, by this [proposition] a signate act is understood, and it is: 
‘Of sound there is first predicated being apprehensible by hearing.’ For that 
predicate is first predicated of this common [term ‘sound’], not for itself but 15 
for [its] singulars. For in such a proposition, where the common [name] 
‘sound’ is in subject position and the predicate ‘apprehensible by a power of 
hearing’ is predicated, ‘sound’ does not supposit for itself and simply but ra-
ther supposits for singulars. For example, in ‘Every sound is apprehensible by 
a power of hearing’, the common [name] ‘sound’ is in subject position, alt-20 
hough not for itself but rather for singulars. So in the signate act ‘sound’ 
supposits simply and for the intention of the soul. But in the exercised act 
both [terms]218 supposit personally and for singulars  that is, for their 
significates. 
(18) There is a plain example of the above from theology. For ‘A 25 
complete intellectual substance that does not depend on [any] other supposi-
tum219 is first a person’ is true for the same reason that ‘Man is the first risible’ 
is true. For the one has the same structure as does the other. I ask then: Does 
the subject of this proposition supposit personally and for singulars? In that 
case it is false, because each [of its] singulars is false. [This] is clear by induc-30 
tion. Or does it supposit simply and for a common form? In that case it is 
false, because no common form is  either first or not first  a person. For 
the notion of a person is inconsistent with every common [entity], even ac-
cording to them. 
                                                 
216As it stands, the second part of this is trivially true. What Ockham means is some-
thing more like “being predicated universally of something, and of nothing but that.”  
217As in the example earlier in the paragraph, ‘Every man is risible and nothing other 
than a man is risible’.  
218That is, ‘sound’ and ‘apprehensible by a power of hearing’.  
219‘Suppositum’ is used here in the metaphysical sense, for an entity in which other 
entities inhere (for example, accidents in a substance, matter and form in the composite), but 
which does not itself inhere in any other entity. The term comes from the theology of the 
Trinity and the Incarnation.  
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(19) It is the same for ‘The singular is first one in number’, ‘The in-
dividual is first distinguished from the common’, and so on for many such 
[propositions] that are literally false, and yet the corresponding signate acts 
are true. 
(20) Thus the error of all those who believed there to be something in 5 
reality besides the singular, and that humanity, which is distinct from singu-
lars, is something in individuals and belongs to their essence, led them into 
these and many other logical errors. But it is not the logician’s job to consider 
this, as Porphyry says in [his] prologue.220 Rather, the logician only has to say 
that simple supposition is not [a term’s supposition] for its significate. When 10 
the term is a common one, [the logician] has to say that simple supposition is 
for something common to its significates. But whether what is common is 
[something] in reality or not, that is not his business. 
(21) To (c) the third [objection], it must be said that an utterance is 
predicated of an utterance, and likewise an intention of an intention, not for 15 
itself but for a thing. Therefore, by a proposition like ‘A man is an animal’, 
even though an utterance is predicated of an utterance or an intention of an 
intention, it is not denoted that the one utterance is the other, or that the one 
intention is the other. Rather, it is denoted [by the proposition] that what the 
subject stands or supposits for is what the predicate stands or supposits for. 20 
(22) But suppose it is still objected against what was said above that 
‘Pepper221 is sold here and at Rome’ is true, and yet no singular [of that propo-
sition] is true. [The proposition] is not true except insofar as ‘pepper’ 
supposits simply. And [the term] does not supposit for an intention.222 There-
fore, simple supposition is not for an intention. 25 
(23) [To this] it must be said that the proposition is simply false if it 
has a coupled extreme,223 because each [of its] singulars is false. It is also false 
according as [the term ‘pepper’] has simple supposition, because no one wants 
to buy the general pepper, whether that is in external reality or in the soul. Ra-
ther everyone means to buy some singular thing that he does not have. 30 
(24) But the proposition is true if it is a copulative [proposition], 
namely, [with the sense] “Pepper is sold and pepper is sold at Rome”. For 
both parts are true for different singulars. Thus ‘Pepper is sold here and at 
Rome’ is not more true than ‘A singular pepper is sold here and at Rome’. 
                                                 
220That is, it is not the job of the logician to solve the problem of universals. See 
Porphyry, Isagoge, Paul Vincent Spade, tr., (Stillwater, OK: Translation Clearing House, 
1986), p. 1 lines 14–23.  
221To get the force of this example, you have to realize that ‘pepper’ is not a mass 
noun here. It means “a pepper.”  
222The intention is not sold both here and at Rome.  
223That is, if it has the compound predicate ‘sold here and [sold] at Rome’.  
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[Chapter 70] 
(1) Personal supposition can be divided first into discrete and common 
supposition. Discrete supposition is [the kind] in which a proper name of 
something supposits, or a demonstrative pronoun taken significatively. This 5 
kind of supposition makes a proposition singular. For example, ‘Socrates is a 
man’, ‘This man is a man’, and so on. 
(2) If it is said that ‘This herb grows in my garden’ is true, and yet the 
subject does not have discrete supposition, it must be said [in reply] that the 
proposition is literally false. But there is understood by it a proposition like 10 
‘Such an herb grows in my garden’, where the subject supposits de-
terminately. Thus, you must observe that when some proposition is literally 
false, but yet has some true sense, [then] when it is taken in that [true] sense, 
[its] subject and predicate should be have the same supposition they have in 
the [proposition] that is literally true. 15 
(3) Common personal supposition occurs when a common term sup-
posits, as in ‘A man runs’, ‘Every man is an animal’. 
(4) Common personal supposition is divided into confused supposition 
and determinate [supposition]. Determinate supposition occurs when one can 
descend to singulars by some disjunctive [proposition]. For example, it cor-20 
rectly follows: “A man runs; therefore, this man runs, or that [man runs]”, and 
so on. Therefore, supposition is called “determinate” because by such suppo-
sition it is denoted that the proposition is true for some determinate singular. 
This determinate singular all by itself, without the truth of another singular, is 
enough to verify the proposition. For example, for the truth of ‘A man runs’ it 25 
is required that some definite singular be true. Any one suffices, even assum-
ing that every other one would be false. Yet often many or even all [of them] 
are true. 
(5) Therefore, there is a fixed rule that when one can descend to sin-
gulars under a common term by a disjunctive proposition, and from each sin-30 
gular the [original] proposition is inferred, then the term has determinate per-
sonal supposition. Therefore, in the proposition ‘A man is an animal’, both 
extremes have determinate supposition. For it follows: “A man is an animal; 
therefore, this man is an animal, or that [man is an animal”, and so on. Like-
wise it follows: “This man is an animal”  pointing to any [man] whatever 35 
 “therefore, a man is an animal.” Likewise, it follows: “A man is an animal; 
therefore, a man is this animal or [a man is] that animal or [a man is]224 that 
                                                 
224The insertions in square brackets are absolutely essential here. Ockham is being 
compressed to the point of being misleading. Without the insertions, the inference as it stands 
would characterize merely confused supposition, not determinate supposition. See para. 7, 
below.  
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one”, and so on. And it correctly follows: “A man is this animal”  pointing 
to any animal  “therefore, a man is an animal.” Therefore, both ‘man’ and 
‘animal’ have determinate supposition. 
(6) Confused personal supposition is every personal supposition of a 
common term that is not determinate [supposition]. It is divided, because one 5 
kind is merely confused supposition, and another kind is confused and distrib-
utive supposition. 
(7) Merely confused personal supposition occurs when a common term 
supposits personally and one cannot descend to singulars by a disjunctive 
[proposition] without making a change on the part of the other extreme, but 10 
[one can descend to singulars] by a proposition with a disjoint predicate, and 
one can infer [the original proposition] from any singular. For example, in 
‘Every man is an animal’, ‘animal’ supposits merely confusedly, because one 
cannot descend under ‘animal’ to its contents by a disjunctive [proposition]. 
For it does not follow: “Every man is an animal; therefore, every man is this 15 
animal, or every man is that animal, or every man is [that] other animal”, and 
so on. But one is quite able to descend to a proposition with a disjoint predi-
cate [made up] of singular [terms]. For it correctly follows: “Every man is an 
animal; therefore, every man is this animal or that one or that one”, and so on. 
And it is plain that this predicate is truly predicated of every man. Therefore, 20 
the universal [proposition] is simply true. Likewise, the [original proposition] 
is inferred from any content under ‘animal’. For it correctly follows: “Every 
man is this animal”  pointing to any animal whatever  “therefore, every 
man is an animal.” 
(8) Confused and distributive supposition occurs when one can de-25 
scend in some way copulatively, if [the term] has many contents, and from no 
one [of them] is [the original proposition] formally inferred. For example, in 
‘Every man is an animal’, the subject supposits confusedly and distributively. 
For it follows: “Every man is an animal; therefore, this man is an animal and 
that man is an animal,” and so on. And it does not formally follow: “This man 30 
is an animal”  pointing to any [man] whatever  “therefore, every man is 
an animal.” 
(9) I said “one can descend in some way copulatively”.225 I said this 
because one cannot always descend in the same way. For sometimes one can 
descend without making any changes in the propositions except that in the 35 
first one226 a common term is in subject or predicate position, and af-
terwards227 singulars [of that common term] are taken, as is clear in the above 
example. But sometimes one can descend [only] after making some change  
in fact, [sometimes only] after removing something in the one proposition that 
occurs in the other [and] that is neither a common term nor contained under a 40 
                                                 
225See the preceding paragraph.  
226That is, the one from which one is descending.  
227That is, in the proposition to which one descends.  
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common term. For example, in saying ‘Every man besides Socrates runs’, one 
can correctly descend copulatively in some way to some singulars. For it cor-
rectly follows: “Every man besides Socrates runs; therefore, Plato runs, and 
Cicero runs,” and so on for [men] other than Socrates. But in these singulars 
something is omitted that occurred in the universal [proposition and] that was 5 
neither a common term nor a sign228 distributing it, namely, the exceptive 
word together with the part taken out.229 So one cannot descend in the same 
way under ‘Every man besides Socrates runs’ and under ‘Every man runs’, 
and one cannot descend to all the same [things] either. 
(10) The first kind of confused and distributive supposition230 is called 10 
“confused and distributive mobile supposition”. The second kind231 is called 
“confused and distributive immobile [supposition]”. 
 
[Chapter 72] 
(1) Doubts can be raised about the above. (a) First, how does ‘man’ 15 
supposit in ‘Socrates was a man’? (Assume that Socrates does not [now] ex-
ist.) Likewise, how do the terms supposit in [propositions] about the past and 
in [propositions] about the future and about the possible, and in other proposi-
tions about a mode? 
(2) The reason for the doubt is that it was said earlier232 that a term 20 
never supposits for anything except [for that] of which it is verified. But 
‘man’, if Socrates does not exist, is not verified of Socrates, because ‘Socrates 
is a man’ is false then. Therefore, it does not supposit for Socrates, and conse-
quently it does not supposit determinately. 
(3) (b) Second, there is a doubt about ‘A white man is a man’, ‘[The 25 
one] singing the Mass is a man’, ‘The creating is God’, assuming that no one 
is white and that no one is singing the Mass and that God does not create.233 
What do the subjects supposit for? For it seems that [they supposit] for no 
thing,234 because they are not verified of any such [thing]. Neither [do they 
supposit] for themselves, because in that case they would not have personal 30 
supposition. Therefore, they do not determinately supposit for anything. Con-
sequently, they do not have determinate supposition. 
                                                 
228That is, a quantifier.  
229This is a bit of technical jargon. The “exceptive word” is of course the syncatego-
rema ‘besides’. The “part taken out” (= pars extra capta) is the object of the preposition ‘be-
sides’. Here it is ‘Socrates’. It is “taken out” in the sense that it is excluded from the claim in 
the rest of the proposition.  
230That is, the kind in ‘Every man runs’.  
231That is, the kind in ‘Every man besides Socrates runs’.  
232See Ch. 63, para. 6, above.  
233In other words, what about non-denoting subjects?  
234That is, “thing” in the sense of an extramental, non-linguistic entity.  
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(4) (c) The third doubt is how the subject supposits in ‘A horse is 
promised to you’, [or] ‘Twenty pounds are owed to you’. The reason for the 
doubt is that if the [subject] term supposits for its contents,235 [the proposi-
tions] seem false, since each [of their] singulars is false. So if the subject term 
supposits determinately, the proposition is false. 5 
(5) (d) The fourth doubt is about ‘He is deprived of sight’, ‘He is natu-
rally apt to have sight’, and so on for many others. 
(6) (e) Fifth, what [kind of] supposition does the predicate have in 
‘Genera and species are second substances’? 
(7) (f) Sixth, [there is a doubt] about ‘An action is a thing outside the 10 
soul’, ‘A relation is a true thing’, ‘Creation is really the same as God’, and 
many such [propositions]. 
(8) (g) The seventh [doubt] is about ‘He twice was white’. For it seems 
that ‘white’ does not supposit determinately [there]. 
(9) (h) The eighth doubt: How do the subject and predicate supposit in 15 
‘Only an animal is a man’. 
(10) (i) Again, [there is a doubt] about ‘The Apostle says this’, ‘Eng-
land fights’, ‘Drink the cup’, ‘The prow is in the sea’, ‘Your goodness acts 
mercifully’, ‘The clemency of the prince governs the realm’, and such.236 
(11) To (a) the first of these [doubts], it must be said that in all such 20 
[propositions] the terms supposit personally. On this point, it must be un-
derstood that a term supposits personally when it supposits for its significates, 
or for [things] that were its significates or will be or can be. The earlier state-
ment237 is to be understood in this sense. For it was stated above238 that ‘to 
signify’ is taken like this in one sense. 25 
(12) But it must be understood that [a term] does not supposit for those 
[things] with respect to just any verb whatever. Rather, [a term] can supposit 
for [the things] it signifies, taking ‘signify’ strictly,239 with respect to any verb 
whatever, if [the term] signifies any such things.240 But it cannot supposit for 
what were its significates except with respect to a verb about the past. There-30 
fore, each such proposition has to be distinguished, insofar as the term can 
supposit for [things] that are or for [things] that were. Likewise, [a term] can-
not supposit for what will be except with respect to a verb about the future. 
Therefore, the proposition [containing a verb about the future] has to be dis-
tinguished, insofar as the term can supposit for [things] that are or for [things] 35 
that will be. Likewise, [a term] cannot supposit for what can be [its] 
                                                 
235That is, for things “contained” under the term. In short, for individuals.  
236This paragraph is missing is several manuscripts. All these examples deal with 
“improper” supposition. See Ch. 77.  
237See para. 2 above, and the reference in n. 232 there.  
238See Ch. 33, para. 2, above (the second sense of ‘signify’).  
239That is, in the first sense of the word. See Ch. 33, para. 1, above.  
240Some terms will fail this condition. For example, the terms ‘dodo’, ‘passenger pi-
geon’, etc.  
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significates, but are not, except with respect to a verb about the possible or 
about the contingent. Therefore, all such [propositions] have to be distin-
guished, insofar as the subject can supposit for [things] that are or for [things] 
that are able to be or can be. Therefore, all the following have to be distin-
guished: ‘Every man was white’, ‘Every white241 will be a man’, ‘Every white 5 
is able to be a man’, ‘Every man can run’. 
(13) Yet it must be understood that this distinction does not fall on the 
part of the predicate, but only on the part of the subject. Thus, ‘Socrates was 
white’ [or] ‘Socrates can be white’ does not have to be distinguished. This [is] 
because “the predicate appellates its form”.242 This is to be understood not in 10 
the sense that [the predicate] supposits for itself or for a concept, but [in the 
sense] that by such a proposition [P] it is denoted that [another] proposition 
[Q] in which the very same predicate, under its own form (that is, it itself and 
none other), is predicated of that for which the subject [of P] supposits, or of a 
pronoun pointing precisely to that for which the subject [of P] supposits, was 15 
true if the proposition [P] is about the past, or that it will be true if the propo-
sition [P] is about the future, or that it is possible if the first proposition [P] is 
about the possible, or [that it is] necessary if the first proposition [P] is about 
the necessary, or per se243 if the first proposition [P] is about [what is] per se, 
or accidental if the first proposition [P] is about [what is] accidental, and so 20 
on for the other [kinds of] modal propositions. 
(14) For example, for the truth of ‘A white was black’ it is not required 
that ‘A white is black’ was ever true. Rather, it is required that ‘This is black’ 
was true, pointing to something the subject supposits for in ‘A white was 
black’. Likewise, for the truth of ‘The true will be impossible’ it is not re-25 
quired that ‘The true is impossible’ ever be true. Rather, it is required that 
‘This is impossible’ will be true (if it is formed244), pointing to something the 
subject supposits for in ‘The true will be impossible’. Likewise for the others. 
But these cases will be discussed more fully in the treatise on propositions and 
on consequences.245 30 
(15) In the present case, I say that in ‘Socrates was white’ the predi-
cate supposits for Socrates. Similarly, it is the case for all [propositions] about 
the past and about the future and about a mode that [their] terms suppositing 
personally supposit for what are or were or will be or can be [their] supposita. 
And if there is no sign246 or negation or any other obstacle, they supposit de-35 
terminately. 
                                                 
241That is, every white thing.  
242See Part II, Ch. 7.  
243On this notion, see Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, 4, 73a21–74a2. The Oxford 
translation renders the term as “essential.”  
244Remember, propositions are tokens for Ockham, so that their existence is not 
guaranteed.  
245See Part II, Ch. 7, and Part III–3, Chs. 10–12.  
246That is, quantifier.  
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(16) But then, as for the reasoning to the contrary,247 it must be said 
that it was correctly stated that a term never supposits for anything except [for 
that] of which it is verified. Nevertheless, it was not said that [a term] never 
supposits for anything except [for that] of which it is verified by a verb about 
the present. Instead it is enough that sometimes it be verified [of that thing] by 5 
a verb about the past when it supposits for it with respect to a verb about the 
past, or by a verb about the future when it supposits with respect to a verb 
about the future, and so on. This is clear for ‘A white was a man’, assuming 
that no man is now white but that Socrates was white. In that case ‘white’ 
supposits for Socrates, if it is taken for [things] that were. Therefore, ‘white’ 10 
is verified of Socrates not by a verb about the present but by a verb about the 
past. For ‘Socrates was white’ is true. 
(17) But a doubt still remains. What does the predicate supposit for in 
‘Socrates was white’? If [it supposits] for [things] that are, [the proposition] is 
false. 15 
(18) It must be said that the predicate supposits for [things] that were, 
whether or not the same [things] were as are [now]. Therefore, in this case 
there is an exception to the rule I stated elsewhere,248 namely, that a term, no 
matter where it occurs, always supposits for [things] that are, or can supposit 
for them. For I understood that rule [as applying] to a term occurring on the 20 
part of the subject. But when [the term] occurs on the part of the predicate, 
[the rule] is not true in every case. Thus, assuming that no man is now white, 
but that there were many white men earlier, in that case in ‘A man was white’ 
the predicate does not supposit for [things] that are but only for [things] that 
were. Hence in general the predicate in [a proposition] about the past does not 25 
supposit for anything other than for what was, and in [a proposition] about the 
future [it does not supposit for anything other than] for what will be, and in [a 
proposition] about the possible [it does not supposit for anything other than] 
for what can be. Nevertheless, along with this it is required that the very same 
predicate be predicated of what the subject supposits for, in the way stated 30 
above.249 
(19) To (b) the second doubt, it must be said that if no man is white 
and if no man is singing the Mass and if God is not creating, [then] literally it 
                                                 
247See para. 2 above.  
248See William of Ockham, Expositio super librum Elenchorum Aristotelis, Ca. 2, 
sect. 9, Francesco del Punta, ed., (“Opera philosophica,” vol. 3; St. Bonaventure, NY: The 
Franciscan Institute, 1979), p. 28 lines 125–135: “For this reason, you have to know that 
whenever a common term occurring on the part of the subject is matched with a verb about 
the past, the proposition has to be distinguished insofar as the subject can supposit for 
[things] that are, that is, for [the things] of which [the subject] is actually verified by a verb 
about the present, or for [things] of which [the subject] was verified at some time in this way. 
This is because a term, wherever it occurs, always has to supposit for [the things] of which it 
is actually verified, but only by reason of [something] adjoined [to it] can it supposit for [the 
things] of which it was verified at some time.”  
249See para. 13, above.  
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must be granted that in the propositions mentioned the subjects supposit for 
nothing. Yet they are taken significatively, because being taken significatively 
or suppositing personally can come about in two ways: either (i) because the 
term supposits for some significate or (ii) because it is denoted to supposit for 
something or because it is denoted not to supposit for anything. For in such 5 
affirmative propositions, the term is always denoted to supposit for some-
thing, and therefore if it supposits for nothing the proposition is false. But in 
negative propositions, the term is denoted not to supposit for anything, or to 
supposit for something of which the predicate is truly denied, and therefore 
such a negative has two causes of [its] truth.250 For example, ‘A white man 10 
does not exist’ has two causes of truth: either (i) because a man does not exist 
and therefore is not white, or (ii) because a man does exist and yet he is not 
white.251 But in the proposition ‘A white man is a man’, if no man is white, the 
subject is taken significatively and personally, not because it supposits for 
something, but because it is denoted to supposit for something. Therefore, be-15 
cause [in fact] it supposits for nothing, although it is denoted to supposit for 
something, [therefore] the proposition is simply false. 
(20) Therefore, if anything said above seems to be inconsistent with 
this, it must be understood [as applying only] in the case of an affirmative and 
true proposition. For in an affirmative and true proposition, if the term stands 20 
personally, it always supposits for some significate, in the manner explained 
earlier.252 
(21) Suppose someone says, “‘It supposits’ and ‘It supposits for noth-
ing’ do not go together, because it follows: ‘It supposits; therefore, it 
supposits for something’.” It must be said that [this] does not follow. Instead it 25 
follows: “It supposits; therefore, it is denoted to supposit for something or de-
noted to supposit for nothing.” 
(22) To (c) the third [doubt], it has to be said that such propositions 
[as] ‘A horse is promised to you’ [and] ‘Twenty pounds are owed to you’ are 
literally false, because each [of their] singulars is false, as is clear by induc-30 
tion. Yet if such terms occur on the part of the predicate,253 [the propositions] 
can be granted after a fashion. In that case, one must say that terms following 
such verbs have, by virtue of those verbs, merely confused supposition. 
Therefore, one cannot descend disjunctively to singulars, but only by a dis-
junctive predicate, counting not only present [things] but also future [ones]. 35 
Thus, it does not follow: “I promise you a horse; therefore, I promise you this 
horse or I promise you that horse,” and so on for present singulars. But it does 
correctly follow: “I promise you a horse; therefore, I promise you this horse or 
that one or that one”, and so on, counting all [horses], both present ones and 
                                                 
250That is, two alternative truth-conditions, either one of which is sufficient.  
251Actually, we have to say more than that. We have to suppose that no other man 
exists who is white.  
252See para. 11–12, above.  
253As in ‘I promise you a horse’ or ‘He owes you twenty pounds’.  
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future ones. This is because such verbs equivalently include verbs about the 
future. Thus ‘I promise you a horse’ amounts to ‘You will have a horse by my 
gift’. 
(23) But does ‘horse’ supposit merely confusedly in ‘I promise you a 
horse’, speaking literally? It must be said that, strictly speaking, ‘horse’ does 5 
not supposit merely confusedly [there], because it does not supposit [at all], 
since it is a part of an extreme. The rule given about determinate supposition 
above254 is about [terms] that strictly speaking supposit, because they are the 
extremes of propositions and not merely the parts of extremes. Nevertheless, 
extending the name, it can be said that ‘horse’ supposits merely confusedly. 10 
This is because it follows such a verb. And so, in general, a common term that 
follows such a verb so that it is not merely a part of the extreme always 
supposits merely confusedly and not determinately. But [it does supposit] per-
sonally. 
(24) Thus, you have to know that whenever in any such proposition 15 
about the present or about the past or about the future there occurs a verb by 
virtue of which it is denoted that some [other] proposition will be true, or 
ought to be true, in which a common term appears on the part of the predicate, 
and it is not denoted for any proposition in which a singular [term] contained 
under that common [term] occurs on the part of the predicate that it will be 20 
true, then (taking ‘supposit’ in the sense in which a part of an extreme can 
supposit) the common term does not supposit determinately. That is, one can-
not descend to singulars by a disjunctive [proposition] but only by a proposi-
tion with a disjoint extreme or with a disjoint part of an extreme. But now it is 
denoted by ‘I promise you a horse’, in virtue of the verb ‘promise’, that ‘I 25 
give you a horse’ or something like that will be true, or that it ought to be true 
sometime. And it is not denoted that any [proposition] like ‘I give you this 
horse’  pointing to any horse whatever  will be or ought to be true. There-
fore, it does not follow: “I promise you a horse; therefore, I promise you this 
horse or I promise you that horse.” The case is similar for such [propositions] 30 
as ‘I owe you twenty pounds’, ‘He is indebted to Socrates to the extent of 
twenty marks’. 
(25) So then it is clear that ‘I promise you a horse’ can be granted, and 
yet ‘A horse to you is promised’ should not in any way be granted literally. 
The reason for this is that in ‘A horse to you is promised’, ‘horse’ is the sub-35 
ject and not a part of the subject. Therefore, it has to supposit determinately, 
since neither a sign255 nor a negation nor anything that includes anything like 
that precedes [the term ‘horse’]. Therefore, one has to be able to descend to 
singulars. But in ‘I promise you a horse’, ‘horse’ is not an extreme but a part 
of an extreme. For the whole ‘promising you a horse’ is the predicate, because 40 
‘I promise you a horse’ and ‘I am promising you a horse’ are equivalent. So 
                                                 
254At the end of para. 15, above.  
255That is, quantifier.  
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‘horse’ is a part of an extreme. Therefore, just as it does not have to supposit, 
properly speaking, so [too] it does not have to supposit determinately. Conse-
quently, one does not have to be able to descend to a disjunctive [proposition]. 
(26) But can one descend [at all] under a part of an extreme? It must 
be said that sometimes one can descend. For example, it correctly follows: 5 
“He gives Socrates a horse; therefore, he gives him this horse or he gives him 
that one,” and so on. But sometimes one cannot descend, on account of some 
special reason like the one stated in the present case. And so, even though ‘I 
promise you a horse’ is granted, nevertheless ‘A horse to you is promised’ is 
not to be granted literally. Yet it is granted [anyway], because it is generally 10 
taken for ‘Someone promises you a horse’. Now it will be explained in the 
treatise on the proposition why the inference “Someone promises you a horse; 
therefore, a horse is promised to you” is not valid.256 
(27) To (d) the fourth [doubt], it must be said that in [propositions] 
like ‘He is deprived of sight’, [the term] ‘sight’, which is part of an extreme, 15 
does not properly supposit. Nevertheless, in the sense in which it can sup-
posit, it supposits confusedly and distributively. For [the proposition] is 
equivalent to ‘He has no sight’, where ‘sight’ is confused negatively con-
fusedly and distributively. But [the term ‘sight’] does not supposit confusedly 
and distributively in every proposition expounding257 [‘He is deprived of 20 
sight’]. For [it does] not [supposit confusedly and distributively] in the affirm-
ative [exponent], namely, in ‘He is by nature apt to have sight’. Rather, in this 
[affirmative exponent the term] supposits in a way determinately, that is, [de-
terminately] for [things258] that were sometime possible  although not for all 
of them, but [only] for those were able to inhere in him. 25 
(28) To (e) the fifth [doubt], it must be said that literally ‘Genera and 
species are substances’ is false. But ‘Genera and species are second sub-
stances’ can be granted. In that case, ‘second substances’ supposits personally 
and determinately, because the name ‘second substance’ is imposed to signify 
second intentions that convey true substances. 30 
(29) Therefore, the opinion is false that says that ‘substance’ can have 
simple supposition and yet supposit for species and genera. But if sometimes 
you find in some author [the statement] that genera and species are substanc-
es, [those] authoritative [statements] should be expounded259 either (i) [so] that 
a signate act is understood by an exercised act. Thus, by ‘Genera and species 35 
are substances’ there is understood ‘Of genera and species there is predicated 
substance’. And [that act] should be exercised as ‘A man is a substance’, ‘An 
animal is a substance’, and so on. Or (ii) the authoritative [statement] should 
be expounded [so] that ‘substance’ is equivocal. For sometimes it signifies 
                                                 
256See Part II, Ch. 7. But this example does not occur there.  
257That is, contained in the analysis of.  
258In particular, for “sights” — that is, for visual faculties.  
259See n. 257, above.  
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true things that are substances really distinct from every real accident and 
from every second intention. ‘Substance’ is taken properly then. [But] some-
times it signifies the intentions that convey substances in the first sense. And 
then, under that understanding, ‘Genera and species are substances’ would be 
granted, taking the predicate personally. But in that case [‘substance’] would 5 
not be taken properly, but rather improperly and transumptively. 
(30) To (f) the sixth [doubt], it must be said that different [people] use 
such abstract [terms] in different ways. For sometimes they use them for 
things, [and] sometimes they use them for names. If [they are used] in the first 
way, then it should be said that they supposit for [the things] for which their 10 
[corresponding] concrete [forms] supposit, according to Aristotle’s view.260 In 
that case, ‘Fire is calefactive261’ and ‘Fire is calefaction’ are equipollent, [and] 
likewise ‘A man is a father’ and ‘A man is paternity’. Indeed properly speak-
ing such concrete and abstract [terms], if the abstract [forms] are imposed to 
signify precisely things, are synonymous names according to the view of Aris-15 
totle and of many philosophers. 
(31) This is not so surprising, as can be convincingly shown. For I take 
the proposition ‘Creation is a true thing’, and I ask: Does ‘creation’ supposit 
[there] for something or for nothing? If [it supposits] for nothing, [then] either 
[‘Creation is a true thing’] will not be a proposition or else it will be a false 20 
proposition. If [‘creation’] does supposit for something, [then it supposits] ei-
ther for an external thing, or for a thing in the soul, or for an aggregate [of the 
two].262 If [it supposits] for an external thing, [then] I ask: For which one? On-
ly God can be given [as an answer]. Therefore, ‘creation’ supposits for God 
just as much as ‘creating’ does. And this can just as easily be said about every 25 
other [example]. 
(32) If [‘creation’] supposits for something in the soul (for example, 
according to some [people],263 it supposits for a relation of reason), that is im-
possible, because in that case ‘Creation is a true thing’ is impossible. Like-
wise, there would never be creation except in the soul, and God would not be 30 
creative except by means of an act of a soul that forms such a relation of rea-
son. Similarly, it could just as easily be said that ‘calefaction’ supposits for 
such a being or relation of reason. And no argument can be given to prove that 
this is a relation in a created agent any more than in the uncreated one. There-
fore, according to the Philosopher’s view, there is no thing that can be signi-35 
fied or connoted by such a concrete [term] unless in the same way it is signi-
fied or connoted by the [corresponding] abstract [term]. Therefore, according 
to him, if both are imposed to signify a thing, they will be synonymous names. 
                                                 
260See Ch. 6, above.  
261That is, it makes things hot.  
262This odd alternative is not discussed any further.  
263For instance, Thomas Aquinas. See his Summa theologiae I, q. 45, a. 3, ad 1.  
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(33) It does no good to say that the mode of signifying blocks [their] 
synonymy. For a difference in mode of signifying does not block synonymy 
except when on account of the different mode of signifying something is sig-
nified or connoted by the one [name] that is not connoted or not signified by 
the other one in the same way. This is clear, for example, in ‘man’, ‘man’s’, 5 
‘men’.264 Likewise, ‘man’, [and] ‘risible’. Likewise, ‘intellect’, ‘will’ and 
‘soul’.265 Likewise ‘creating’, ‘governing’,266 ‘damning’, ‘beatifying’, and so 
on for all the others. These are verified of the same [thing], and yet they are 
not synonymous. If a mere difference in the mode signifying of affected syn-
onymy, I would just as easily say that ‘tunic’ and ‘cloak’ are not synonyms 10 
because ‘tunic’ ends in ‘c’ and ‘cloak’ does not. So too for many other cases. 
(34) So synonymy is not blocked by such a difference [in mode of sig-
nifying], either with respect to the ending or with respect to accidents like 
gender and such, or with respect to other [features], like [being] an adjective 
and [being] a substantive and so on. Yet when there is a different mode of 15 
signifying properly speaking, there is no synonymy. But this does not happen 
in the present case, as is plainly clear, because a concrete [term] and the [cor-
responding] abstract [term] can have exactly the same mode of signifying 
when the concrete and the abstract are not like the ones that belong to the first 
mode,267 as was said in the beginning of this treatise.268 20 
(35) So, then, such abstract [terms], when they are taken significa-
tively for things, are names synonymous with [their] concrete [forms], ac-
cording to Aristotle’s meaning. But according to the theologians, one perhaps 
has to say something else in certain cases, although not in all.269 
(36) Sometimes, however, men use such abstract [terms] in the way 25 
the [corresponding] concrete [terms] signify. For example, they do this for 
‘privation’, ‘negation’, ‘contradiction’, and the like. So in ‘A man is a rela-
tion’, ‘relation’ supposits significatively and for relative names.270 Likewise, 
‘similitude’ sometimes supposits for a relative name, that is, for the name 
‘similar’. Likewise, ‘creation’ [sometimes supposits] for the name ‘creating’, 30 
and ‘quantity’ for the name ‘quantum’, and so [too] for many such abstract 
[names] that do not have concrete [forms] corresponding to them [and that] 
                                                 
264The “modes of signifying” here are: nominative singular, genitive singular, and 
nominative/accusative plural, respectively. Presumably, Ockham intends these names to be 
synonymous, even though they differ in their “modes of signifying.” But in the examples that 
follow, there is no synonymy, because different things are “connoted.”  
265Ockham held that there was no real distinction between the soul and its “facul-
ties,” such as the intellect and the will.  
266In the sense in which God “governs” the world.  
267That is, concretes and abstracts of the kind discussed in Ch. 5, above.  
268See Ch. 6, above.  
269See Ch. 7, above.  
270This is badly put. What Ockham means is that it supposits significatively for the 
same things relative names supposit for. So too in the following sentences.  
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supposit for things distinct from the things that are signified by the abstract 
[forms], according to Aristotle’s meaning. 
(37) Therefore, for all such abstract [terms], in the same way it is 
granted that the predicate ‘thing outside the soul’ is predicated of them, it 
should be granted that their concrete [form is predicated] of them, and the 5 
same [thing] for which their concrete form supposits.271 For as has often been 
said, if such abstract [terms] are precisely names of first intention, they will be 
names synonymous with their concrete [forms], according to Aristotle’s opin-
ion, as it seems to me. 
(38) This is the reason why few such abstract [names] are found [to be 10 
used] by Aristotle. For he regarded all such [pairs as] ‘man/humanity’, 
‘horse/horsehood’, ‘animal/animality’, ‘ass/asininity’, ‘cow/cowship’, ‘quan-
tum/quantity’, ‘relative/relation’, ‘similar/similitude’, ‘calefactive/ calefac-
tion’, ‘father/fatherhood’, ‘ternary/trinity’, ‘dual/duality’, and the like  as syn-
onyms when they are names precisely of first intention. 15 
(39) But according to the speakers’ usage, abstract [terms] are some-
times names of second intention or second imposition, and in that case they 
are not synonymous [with their corresponding concrete terms]. 
(40) Other [people], however, say that all such abstract names signify 
distinct things, or relations of reason, and supposit for them. 20 
(41) To (g) the seventh doubt, it must be said that in ‘Socrates twice 
was white’ there occurs a word that equivalently includes a negation, namely, 
the word ‘twice’. Thus, in virtue of this word, [the proposition] ‘Socrates 
twice was white’ has a negative exponent. For it is equivalent to ‘Socrates 
first was white, and at some time afterwards he was not white, and after that 25 
he was white’.272 Because of the negative [exponent that is] equivalently in-
cluded, [the term ‘white’] does not stand merely determinately so that one can 
descend by a disjunctive [proposition] to pronouns or proper names express-
ing the [things] for which the predicate supposits. 
(42) The case is similar for ‘Socrates begins to be white’, ‘A man 30 
ceases to be literate’, and in general for [all] such [propositions] that have a 
negative exponent. 
(43) The same [thing] holds for (h) the other doubt. ‘Only an animal is 
a man’ has an exclusive word273 on account of which [the proposition] has a 
negative exponent. Therefore, neither the subject nor the predicate supposits 35 
determinately. 
(44) To (i) the ninth [doubt], it must be said that if [the proposition] is 
taken literally, the terms supposit the same way they do in other [proposi-
                                                 
271I’ve done the best I can with this sentence, although I suspect there is a corruption 
of the Latin text here. I cannot make good sense of it as it stands.  
272The three conjuncts here are three “exponents” giving the analysis of the original 
sentence. Note that the second one, as Ockham says, is negative.  
273Namely, the ‘only’.  
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tions]. But according to the speakers’ usage they supposit improperly for other 
[things]. 
